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DEFINITIONS5 
Data subject Natural person 
Personal data Information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. 
Profiling Any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of 
personal data to evaluate personal aspects relating to a natural person, in 
particular to analyze or predict aspects concerning that natural person's 
performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, 
reliability, behavior, location or movements 
Pseudonymisation The processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no 
longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional 
information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is 
subject to technical and organizational measures to ensure that the personal data 
are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person. 
Competent authority Any public authority, body or entity entrusted by Member State law to exercise 
public powers and competent for the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including 
the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security 
Controller EU law: Who “alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data”. CoE law adds that a controller decides which 
categories of personal data should be stored. 
Processor A natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller. 
Processing Any operation which is performed upon personal data, such as collection, 
recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, 
use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction. 
Genetic data Personal data, relating to the inherited or acquired genetic characteristics of a 
natural person which give unique information about the physiology or the health 
                                                 
5 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2; EU Data Protection Directive on Police Matters 
2016/680, Article 3; Convention 108, 1981, Article 2. 
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of that natural person and which result from an analysis of a biological sample 
from the natural person in question 
Biometric data Personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, 
physiological or behavioral characteristics of a natural person, which allow or 
confirm the unique identification of that natural person 
Supervisory authority An independent public authority which is established by a Member State pursuant 
to Article 41 
Third party A natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body other than 
the data subject, the controller, the processor and the persons who, under the 
direct authority of the controller or the processor, are authorized to process the 
data. 
Recipient A natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body to whom 
data are disclosed. Authorities which may receive data in the framework of a 
particular inquiry are not regarded as recipients 
Data subject´s 
consent 
Freely given specific and informed indication of her wishes by which the data 
subject signifies her agreement to personal data relating to her being processed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The objective of the thesis 
The Finnish Police Code defines the duty and mission of law enforcement agencies, whose 
task is the protection of legal and judicial order in society, the maintenance of public order 
and security, as well as general crime prevention, investigation and placing to prosecution. 
As such, the police are tasked with cooperating with other officials, residents, and society 
as a whole in order to maintain public security, in addition to taking care of international 
cooperation in this field.6  
This research introduces the duty of law enforcement agencies concerning the protection 
and exchange of personal data between the EU member states´ investigative authorities, 
namely the police. The authorities try to fight against serious crimes and terrorism and in 
that fight they occasionally interfere with individuals’ fundamental rights. The authorities 
must maintain a balance between two interests: the maintenance of national security and 
the adequate protection of personal data and privacy. These interests should not be seen as 
competing in the sense that if the other is well protected the other would not be protected.  
The EU´s data protection law is currently under reform. The Union has adopted the 
General Data Protection Regulation7 (GDPR) to repeal the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC8 (DPD), which is currently governing the protection of personal data in the EU. 
The DPD applies to processing of personal data in member states in the public and the 
private sectors, but it does not apply to activities in the areas of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters and police cooperation. To fix this lack of scope, the EU adopted the Data 
Protection Directive on Police Matters 2016/6809.  
The core question of this thesis is whether the Data Protection Directive on Police Matters 
ensures the protection of the right to privacy. It will be answered with three points. Firstly, 
with an optimistic interpretation espousing that it does as the legislative level of protection 
is already good and the data protection principles are just going to be extended to cover 
                                                 
6 Poliisilaki 872/2011, Section 1(1). 
7 EU Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation. 
8 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. 
9 EU Data Protection Directive on Police Matters 2016/680. 
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police matters. Secondly, with the realistic approach. It is currently too early to say as the 
Directive is just being implemented. And thirdly by presenting threats to the Directive´s 
implementation. The member states´ legislations and cultures differ from each other as 
well as the new Directive´s abstract provisions gives the member states room for 
interpretation. 
The structure of the thesis 
This thesis asks whether the forthcoming legal instrument will ensure the protection of 
privacy in the EU. On many occasions, the thesis will discuss the concept of adequate 
protection of privacy. The “adequacy” will not be put forth as such as there is currently no 
EU level standard for it, except when personal data is sent from an EU state to a third 
country. Adequacy of protection is an evolving concept. The level of protection of personal 
data and the protection of privacy must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. This 
evaluation considers the whole chain of actions conducted in the processing of personal 
data and continues through the entire lifespan of the data. There is no such magical article 
from which protection can be invoked. Therefore, this paper will go through all the 
relevant legislation governing the field and introduce the evolution of the data protection 
principles in relation to privacy in the case law European Courts. 
This paper is divided into four sections. The first section introduces the current European 
legislation covering the investigative authorities´ work in relation to the protection of 
personal data and the protection of the right to privacy. It explains the operation of both 
systems, those being the legislations of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the EU and after 
this it shows the main principles guiding the processing of personal data. The second 
section goes through the recent trends found in the European Courts in relation to the 
protection of personal data and privacy. The second section first scans the principles and 
interpretations laid down by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and then the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Via those cases, this thesis shows the 
connection between the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter) as well as the CJEU´s link to the 
interpretations of the ECtHR. 
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The third section will explain how the EU´s legislation on data protection is going to 
change in the field of police matters. The forthcoming Data Protection Directive on Police 
Matters sets new guidelines for the member states to protect personal data in criminal 
matters. It is a Directive “on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, and on the free movement of such data”10. The third section introduces the 
aspects which effected on the growing need for uniformed data protection in this field and 
the phases of the data protection reform.  
The fourth section states that the forthcoming Data Protection Directive on Police Matters 
does protect the right to privacy, and it answers to this core claim of the thesis. This section 
introduces the current Finnish data protection practices in the public authorities´ work as 
possible examples for other EU states on how they could adapt their national systems. 
Lastly, the section introduces what problems the new Directive may face when it is being 
implemented into national legislations and what advantages the Union wide uniform data 
protection legislation brings with it.  
Understanding the terms "privacy" and "data protection" 
The term “privacy” may, in some countries mean the same thing or refer to the same 
principles as when other countries refer to “data protection”. It may also be that in some 
countries the “data protection” is used to mean “information security” which may slightly 
overlap with “privacy”. The term “data protection” may refer to the protection of personal 
information and the protection of confidential and valuable information, trade secrets, 
know-how, as well as similar information assets. So, the uses of the terms “data 
protection” and “privacy” differ based on where those are adopted, maybe because of the 
language spoken or depending on the region where the country is located. In the US, the 
term “privacy” seems to prevail when identifying the rules and practices in collection of 
data, use and processing of personal information, while outside the US, the term “data 
protection” has been more widely used than “privacy.”11 
                                                 
10 EU Data Protection Directive on Police Matters 2016/680. 
11 Gilbert, 2014. 
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Individuals usually want to have their human rights protected. Susanna Lindroos-
Hovinheimo considers this to be a collective demand. When individuals want the state to 
protect their personal data and the right to privacy, this is a demand by an individual for 
herself. The demand is not for the collective. The society does not have a joint goal. 
Individuals have lost their ability to have an effect on their material, physical and 
economic conditions. The only thing they have left is the control of their private self-
image. The lives lived and the lives narrated wind-up together and they both can be 
influenced by regulating the right to the protection of privacy and personal data.12  
Public authorities collect and control information concerning persons, natural and legal. 
This term “information” consists of everything from personal identification numbers, home 
addresses and possessed vehicles to possible criminal records, health matters and so on. 
The public authority should be under surveillance and should operate according to the law 
concerning its maintenance of the person’s information. This new Directive and this thesis 
both talk about “competent authorities” who handle personal data. These may include 
public authorities such as the judicial authorities, the police, and other law-enforcement 
authorities or anyone assigned by member state law to exercise public authority for this 
Directives´ purposes.13  
Occasionally this thesis makes broad claims of public officials´ work in practice without 
fully justifying them. The reason for this is that the author is a public official while writing 
the paper and the information is classified in some cases. 
 
                                                 
12 Lindroos-Hovinheimo, 2016, p. 133. 
13 EU Data Protection Directive on Police Matters 2016/680, Recital 11. 
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1 THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND PERSONAL DATA IN THE EUROPEAN 
AUTHORITIES WORK TODAY 
This first section of the paper will introduce the concepts of protecting personal data and 
privacy and the relevant legislations of the field in the Europe, dividing into the areas of 
the CoE and the EU. Approximately half of the CoE countries form the EU and the EU 
member states are under two different jurisprudences, the law of the CoE and the law of 
the EU. Even though this thesis is focused on data protection from the perspective of 
investigative authorities, it will nevertheless introduce the main legislative tools and data 
processing principles covering the field from the individual´s perspective as well. 
1.1 CoE legislation related to the right to privacy and data protection 
This chapter explains in detail how the individual´s rights to the protection of privacy and 
to the protection of personal data are regulated in the CoE´s legislation. The CoE was 
founded in 1949 and today it has 47 member states. The CoE can enforce international 
agreements agreed upon by European states.14 The best-known body of the CoE is the 
ECtHR, which enforces the human rights instrument the ECHR.15 Individuals, NGOs and 
legal persons can bring cases directly to the ECtHR,16 which the CoE member states have 
implemented or given effect to in their national legislation so they must comply with it.17 
The ECHR, written in 1949, does not contain provisions on protecting individual´s 
personal data and it does not mention “privacy”. Instead it rules about the right to respect 
for private life which can be understood to mean the same thing. Article 818 states that:  
1. “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
                                                 
14 The Council of Europe in brief, Who we are, 2016. 
15 Neacşu, 2015. Chapter 4. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, 
p. 14. Originally the ECHR established two judicial bodies: the European Commission of Human Rights 
alongside the ECtHR. The Commission operated, from 1953 until 1999 as an intermediary preventing trivial 
cases entering the ECtHR. UNHCR, Council of Europe: European Commission on Human Rights, 2016. 
Before 1998, natural persons did not have direct access to the ECtHR. First, they had to apply to the 
Commission, which would refer the case in the ECtHR on individual's behalf. 
16 ECHR Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
restructuring the control machinery established thereby, ETS No.155, 1998. 
17 ECHR, 1950, Article 19: “To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High 
Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European Court of 
Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as “the Court”. It shall function on a permanent basis”. 
18 Ibid, Article 8. 
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2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” 
The ECtHR is the only international court that has jurisprudence regarding the right to 
privacy.19 It has clarified20 that the ECHR Article 8 obliges states to refrain from actions 
which might violate this right and that the states are also under positive obligation to 
actively secure effective respect for privacy.21 
1.1.1 The Convention 108 is the first data protection instrument 
The CoE Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108)22 is the first binding international 
instrument protecting individuals against abuses which may accompany the collection and 
processing of personal data. The Convention 108 applies to all data processing carried out 
by the private and public sectors, such as investigative authorities. It demands that the 
collected and processed data is adequate, relevant, proportionate and accurate. It is ratified 
by the CoE member states (currently 47), and it is also open to non-CoE states (as an 
example Senegal and Uruguay have ratified it23).24 Formally Convention 108 has one 
purpose: to ensure data protection.25 It also secures the free flow of data and has provisions 
on "trans-border data flows".26 It prohibits restriction to flows of personal data going to 
another party´s territory taken "for the sole purpose of the protection of privacy"27.  
According to the Convention 108, data protection deals with the protection of natural 
persons, but the signatories can extend the protection also to legal persons in their national 
law.28 The Convention provides guarantees in relation to the collection and processing of 
personal data and prohibits the processing of "sensitive" data on a person's race, politics, 
health, religion, sexual life, criminal record, etc., if appropriate legal safeguards are not in 
                                                 
19 Cocq, 2016, p. 188. 
20 ECtHR, No. 20511/03, I. v. Finland, 17.7.2008. & ECtHR, No. 2872/02, K.U. v. Finland, 2.12.2008. 
21 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 15. 
22 Convention 108, 1981. 
23 Council of Europe, Treaty office, 2016. 
24 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 16-17. 
25 Convention 108, 1981, Article 1. 
26 Ibid, Chapter 3. 
27 Ibid, Article 12(2). 
28 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 38. 
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place. It enshrined individuals´ right to know what information is stored on them and to 
correct false information. The rights laid down in the Convention 108 may be restricted 
when overriding interests (such as state security, etc.) are at stake. The Convention 
provides restrictions on cross-border transmission of personal data to states where legal 
regulation does not provide equal and adequate protection.29  
Convention 108 addresses the notion of quality of data, special categories of data and data 
security.30 The notion of data quality is important as it refers to the idea that: 31 
• the personal data´s automatic processing must be fair and lawful;  
• the data must be stored for specified and legitimate purposes and that data should not 
be used in a way incompatible with those purposes;  
• the data must be adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to such purposes;  
• the data must be accurate and kept up to date and kept in a form enabling the 
identification of the data subjects only if it is necessary.  
In relation to the data subject´s rights the Convention recognizes: the right to information 
on the existence of automated personal data files and on the controller of the files; the right 
to access the stored data concerning her; the right to obtain rectification or erasure of the 
data if it is processed unduly; and the right to have a remedy in case of lack of 
compliance.32 The Convention allows derogation from these principles if the measure is 
provided for by the national law and constitutes a necessary measure in a democratic 
society to protect state security, public safety, the state´s monetary interests or the 
prevention of criminal offences and protecting the rights and freedoms of others or the data 
subject.33 
Convention 108 considers that the protection of personal data serves privacy. To justify the 
reference to the right to the protection of personal data, it has been argued that the right has 
acquired an autonomous meaning through the case law of the ECtHR. This is dealt in the 
section 2. Since 2011 Convention 108 has been under reconsideration.34 
                                                 
29 Summary of Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data, 28.1.1981. 
30 Convention 108, 1981, Article 7. 
31 Ibid, Article 5(a) - (e). 
32 Ibid, Article 8(a) – (d).  
33 Ibid, Article 9. 
34 Fuster, 2014, p. 91. 
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1.1.2 The CoE legislation on data protection in police matters 
Convention 108 covers data protection in police matters although the member states may 
limit its application.35 The public authorities’ tasks may require processing of an 
individual’s personal data in a way which brings consequences to her. The CoE adopted 
the Police Data Recommendation36 in 1987 to guide Convention 108 parties in the context 
of processing personal data by the national authorities. This Recommendation is not legally 
binding, but it guides on the collection of data for police work; who can access the data; 
what are the conditions for transferring data to foreign authorities; how the data subjects 
can exercise their data protection rights; and how to implement the independent 
authorities´ control. There is also an obligation to provide adequate data security.  
Personal data should be collected only when needed to prevent a real danger or to suppress 
a specific criminal offence. Sensitive data´s processing is limited to what is necessary in 
the context of a specific inquiry. If personal data are collected without the data subject´s 
knowledge, she must be informed of the collection as soon as it does not disturb the 
investigations any longer. If police collect personal data by automated means, it should be 
based on specific provisions.37 The retention of personal data by public authorities 
interferes with the ECHR Article 8(1). The stored administrative data should be distinct 
from the police data, as well as the data between different data subjects. The facts must be 
distinct from the suspicions.38 The use of police data should be strictly limited to the 
purpose of collection. That data may be transferred within the police sector only if there is 
a legitimate interest for such exchange. It may be transferred outside the police sector only 
if there is a legal obligation or authorization for this. International transfer is restricted to 
foreign police authorities. It must be based on legal provisions and international 
agreements unless there is a necessity in preventing imminent danger.39 
There must be a national independent authority to supervise the police´s data processing to 
make sure it complies with domestic data protection law. The data subjects are entitled to 
have all the access rights provided by Convention 108. If these rights are restricted under 
                                                 
35 Convention 108, 1981, Article 3. 
36 CoE Police Data Recommendation Rec(87)15, 17.9.1987. 
37 Ibid, Principles 1 – 8. 
38 Ibid, Principle 3. 
39 Ibid, Principle 5. 
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Convention 108 Article 940 for the need of police investigations, the data subject must be 
able to appeal to the national data protection supervisory authority or to another 
independent body, which makes sure the refusal of access is well founded.41 
The CoE has adopted the Convention on Cybercrime to handle the issue of crimes 
committed against and by means of electronic networks.42 This Convention developed the 
protection of personal data and the authorities´ rights to cooperate internationally43 as well 
as to search computer networks and to intercept individual´s communications44. This 
Convention requires parties to update and harmonize their criminal laws against hacking 
and other security infringements and illicit cyber-activities45. The signatories must protect 
human rights adequately, including the right to privacy.46 The Convention has currently 49 
ratifications, also the non-CoE members may accede to it.47 
1.2 EU legislation related to the right to privacy and data protection 
This chapter will go through how the rights to privacy and to the protection of personal 
data are regulated in the EU. The 28 EU member states must be able to rely on a high level 
and uniform data protection to enable the free flow of data which is required for the 
freedom of movement in the internal market48. The Union should act jointly to offer 
European citizens a high level of protection in the area of freedom, security and justice.49 
                                                 
40 Convention 108, 1981, Article 9(2)(A): Derogation from the provisions of Convention Articles 5, 6 and 8 
shall be allowed when such derogation is provided for by the law of the Party and constitutes a necessary 
measure in a democratic society in the interests of a protecting State security, public safety, the monetary 
interests of the State or the suppression of criminal offences. 
41 CoE Police Data Recommendation Rec(87)15, 17.9.1987, Principle 6. 
42 CoE Convention on Cybercrime CETS No. 185, 23.11.2001. 
43 Ibid, Chapter 3 provides general principles relating to international co-operation, to extradition, to mutual 
assistance, procedures pertaining to mutual assistance requests in the absence of applicable international 
agreements, and mutual assistance regarding investigative powers as well as 24/7 Network. 
44 Ibid, Articles 19 and 21. 
45 Ibid, Articles 7 - 10. 
46 Ibid, Preamble & Article 15(1): Each party ensures that the establishment, implementation and application 
of the powers and procedures are subject to domestic law´s safeguards, which provides for the adequate 
protection of human rights and liberties, including rights arising pursuant to obligations under the ECHR and 
other international human rights instruments, and which incorporates the proportionality principle. 
47 Full list, Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 185, Convention on Cybercrime, Council of 
Europe, 2.10.2016. By October 2016 it was ratified, as non-CoE members, by Australia, Canada, Dominican 
Republic, Israel, Japan, Mauritius, Panama, Sri Lanka, and the United States. The only CoE states which 
have not signed the Convention are San Marino and Russia. 
48 TEU, Article 3(3): EU has established an internal market. (TFEU), Article 26: It is an area without internal 
borders to ensure the free movement of persons, capital, goods and services. 
49 TEU, Article 3(2): EU develops and maintains an area of freedom, security and justice without internal 
frontiers, where persons’ freedom of movement is ensured in connection with adequate measures referring to 
external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention of crime. 
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This area establishes respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and 
traditions of the member states.50 The topic of this thesis falls in the area of freedom, 
security and justice, which belongs into the third pillar of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters51. In this field the Union and the member states have the shared 
competence to legislate.52 The CJEU can hear preliminary matters under the third pillar as 
the courts last resort, and to hear references on the interpretation of, for example, 
framework decisions under it if the member states have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction.53  
1.2.1  EU´s primary law related to data protection and privacy 
This chapter will introduce the main provisions related to the protection of personal data 
and the right to privacy in the EU today. The Lisbon Treaty54, which came into force in 
2009, modified the EU´s architecture for the protection of fundamental rights in general. It 
created the EU´s current human rights legislation as it amended the two treaties, the TEU55 
and the TFEU56, and gave the Charter the same legal value as the treaties.57 
The protection of personal data is regulated by TFEU Article 16, which states that58: 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them. 
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies, and by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within 
the scope of Union law, and the rules relating to the free movement of such data. 
Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities. 
The rules adopted on the basis of this Article shall be without prejudice to the specific 
rules laid down in Article 39 of the Treaty on European Union. 
                                                 
50 Barnard, 2013, p. 12. TFEU, Article 67(1). In simple, the “freedom” refers to the absence of internal 
border controls for persons and a shared policy towards the third-country nationals. “Security” refers to the 
measures for preventing and fighting xenophobia, racism, and crime, but also to the cooperation between 
judicial authorities and other competent authorities as well as mutual recognition of judgements in criminal 
matters. The “justice” refers to the access to justice based on the principle of mutual recognition of judicial 
decisions in civil matter.  
51 TEU, Title VI. 
52 TFEU, Article 4, shared competence: both the EU and the member states may legislate, but member states 
only to the extent that the EU has not exercised its competence first (internal market, consumer protection, 
and the area of freedom, security and justice).  
53 Barnard, 2013, p. 542. 
54 Treaty of Lisbon amending the TEU and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 2007. 
55 TEU. 
56 TFEU. 
57 Fuster, 2014, p. 230-231. 
58 TFEU, Article 16. 
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Article 16(2) brings a new dimension to the EU arena by providing a legal basis for the 
Parliament and the Council to lay down rules on personal data for data processing falling 
under EU law. The TEU adds Article 39 which states59 that:  
  “In accordance with [the TFEU] Article 16 and by way of derogation from paragraph 
2 thereof, the Council shall adopt a decision laying down the rules relating to the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the Member 
States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of this Chapter, and the 
rules relating to the free movement of such data. Compliance with these rules shall be 
subject to the control of independent authorities.” 
The Charter is a new treaty embodying the EU data protection law.60 Originally it was not 
a legally binding document when it was ratified in 2000. In 2009 the Lisbon Treaty made it 
as part of the Union´s primary law.61 The right to privacy is guaranteed in the Charter 
Article 7 which states that: “everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and 
family life, home and communications.”  
The right to the protection of personal data is regulated in the Charter Article 8:  
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 
The Explanations of the Charter´s Articles states62 that Article 8 is based on the Lisbon 
Treaty Article 28663, which was then replaced by the TFEU Article 1664, the TEU Article 
3965 and DPD66, as well as on the ECHR Article 867 and on Convention 10868. The 
                                                 
59 TEU, Article 39. 
60 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 20. 
61 Treaty of Lisbon amending the TEU and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 2007, Article 
6(1): The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter, which shall have the 
same legal value as the Treaties. 
62 Explanations relating to the EU Charter, 14.12.2007, Explanation on Article 8. 
63 Treaty of Lisbon amending the TEU and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 2007, Article 
286: “1. From 1 January 1999, Community acts on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and the free movement of such data shall apply to the institutions and bodies set 
up by, or on the basis of, this Treaty. 2. Before the date referred to in paragraph 1, the Council, acting in 
accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, shall establish an independent supervisory body 
responsible for monitoring the application of such Community acts to Community institutions and bodies and 
shall adopt any other relevant provisions as appropriate.” 
64 TFEU, Article 16: see footnote 58. 
65 TEU, Article 39: See footnote 59. 
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Explanations refers also to EU Regulation 45/200169 containing conditions and limitations 
for the exercise of the right to the personal data protection.70 Article 8 was formed several 
years after the DPD so it can be considered as embodying the pre-existing EU data 
protection law. The Article´s second part refers to the key data protection principles and 
the third part provides that an independent authority should be established for controlling 
the implementation of these principles.71 By recognizing the right to data protection, the 
Charter in fact created it.72 
The Charter Article 52 sets the scope of rights guaranteed by the Charter and accepts 
limitations on their utilization. The limitations must be provided for by law and respect the 
essence of those rights and freedoms. The limitations must be necessary and proportionate. 
They must meet the general interest objectives recognized by the EU or to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others.73 
The Charter strengthens the already existing rights instead of creating new ones, when it 
declares that the Charter confirms the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the member states.74 It has been 
described as an innovative instrument allowing the EU to follow the changes in society and 
                                                                                                                                                    
66 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. 
67 ECHR, Article 8: see footnote 18. 
68 Convention 108, 1981. 
69 EU Regulation 45/2001, on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by 
the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data, 18.12.2000. 
70 Explanations relating to the EU Charter, 14.12.2007, Explanation on Article 8. 
71 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 20. 
72 Fuster, 2014, p. 2. 
73 Charter of fundamental rights of the EU, 2009, Article 52: "1. Any limitation on the exercise of the rights 
and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights 
and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary 
and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others. 2. Rights recognised by this Charter for which provision is made in the Treaties shall 
be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those Treaties. 3. In so far as this Charter 
contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the [ECHR], the meaning and scope of those rights 
shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection. 4. In so far as this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall be interpreted in harmony 
with those traditions. 5. The provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by 
legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of 
Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective powers. They shall 
be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality. 6. Full 
account shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter. 7. The explanations drawn 
up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of this Charter shall be given due regard by the 
courts of the Union and of the Member States." 
74 EU Declaration No 1 concerning the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, annexed to the 
Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, 13.12.2007. 
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technological developments.75 It reaffirms the fundamental rights as they result from “the 
constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the Member States”, as 
well as from the EU´s primary law, the ECHR, the Social Charters adopted by the 
Community and the CoE, and the case law of both the CJEU and the ECtHR.76  
1.2.2  EU´s secondary law related to data protection  
As the primary law of the rights to data protection and privacy is written in a few separate 
Articles in different Treaties, the secondary law is spread in several different instruments77 
covering specific issues. Since its adoption in 1995 the EU´s main legal instrument to 
protect personal data has been the DPD78, which aimed to harmonize the data protection 
laws in the Union at the national level.79 The object of the DPD is to ensure that the 
member states protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and their 
right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data. The free flow of personal 
data between the member states should not be restricted nor prohibited.80  
The DPD gives substance to the principles of the right to privacy and data protection which 
were contained in Convention 108 and strengthens them.81 The DPD does not apply in the 
areas of the processing of personal data by private individuals for personal purposes, nor to 
the matters outside of the internal market - the police and criminal justice cooperation.82 
But it does apply when a private person publishes data about others by using internet.83  
                                                 
75 EU Commission, Communication from the Commission: Strategy for the effective implementation of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union. COM (2010) 573, 19.10.2010, p. 3. 
76 Charter of fundamental rights of the EU, 2009, Preamble. 
77 Rosas & Armati, 2012, p. 61–63, The secondary law are Regulations, Directives, Decisions, Opinions and 
Recommendations and Conventions, and international Agreements. And (TFEU), Article 288: Regulations 
are directly applicable to the member states and they bind in their entirety. Directives are binding upon each 
member state to which it is addressed, but they leave the choice of form and methods of how it is enforced to 
the national authorities. Decision is binding in its entirety or if it addresses its objects, it binds only on them. 
Recommendations and Opinions do not have binding force. 
78 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. 
79 What is an EU Directive?, 28.8.2016: Directive sets the objectives which must be reached Union widely. 
They are directed at the member states which then gives effect to its terms by passing domestic legislation. 
They may set minimum standards to be applied at national level, or allow member states to apply stricter 
national measures, if those do not conflict with the rules on free movement and free market. 
80 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Article 1. 
81 Ibid, Recital 11. 
82 Ibid, Article 3(2). 
83 CJEU, C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist, 6.11.2003, paras 27 & 47. 
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Additionally, to the DPD there is often a need for more detailed data protection provisions 
in different areas. The EU adopted the E-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC84 (on privacy in 
electronic communications), which established that member states may “adopt legislative 
measures providing for the retention of data for a limited period”, for purposes such as 
security or crime prevention.85 This enabled the member states to operate against the basic 
principle that traffic data must be erased or made anonymous as soon as possible. The Data 
Retention Directive 2006/24/EC86 is to obligate telecommunication service providers to 
retain specified metadata for periods between 6 months and 2 years. This is to ensure the 
data’s availability for the investigation and prosecution of serious crime. The main 
objective is to harmonize member states’ law regarding data retention, which must comply 
with the Charter Articles 7 and 8.87 
The Union lacked a data protection tool for the protection of individuals’ privacy when the 
EU institutions processed their personal data, as the DPD addresses to the member states.88 
For this task the EU established the EU Institutions Data Protection Regulation 45/200189. 
This Regulation is also important as it established the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(EDPS).90 The EDPS is an independent body monitoring the application of the data 
protection rules by EU institutions and bodies, and it advices these institutions and the data 
subjects on matters concerning the processing of personal data. EU citizens can complain 
directly to the EDPS if they consider their data protection rights are not respected.91 The 
role of the EDPS is important. For example, it was heard during the EU Data Protection 
Reform. This will be dealt more accurately in the section 3. 
1.2.3 EU´s legislation on data protection in police matters 
This chapter will introduce how the protection of personal data is currently regulated at the 
EU level in police matters. The DPD does not apply to the area of police and judicial co-
                                                 
84 EU Directive 2002/58/EC, E-privacy Directive, as amended by EU Directive 2009/136/EC amending 
Directive 2002/22/EC, Directive 2002/58/EC and Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004, 25.11.2009. OJ 2009 L 
337, 18.12.2009. 
85 Ibid, Article 15(1). 
86 EU Directive 2006/24/EC, Data Retention Directive. 
87 Ibid, Articles 1 & 6 and Recitals 4, 5, 7 to 11, 21 and 22. 
88 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 19. 
89 EU Regulation 45/2001, on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by 
the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. 
90 Ibid, Chapter V. 
91 Ibid, Article 41 & 46. 
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operation in criminal matters.92 In 2008 the EU adopted the Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA93 to protect personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. It repeats the principles specified by the Convention 108 
and the DPD94 and it ensures data protection in the cross-border cooperation between these 
authorities and its applicability does not extend to national security. The aim is to protect 
natural persons´ personal data when it is processed to prevent, investigate, detect, or 
prosecute a criminal offence or to execute criminal penalty.95 It incorporates a joint 
reference to the Charter Articles 7 and 8.96  
The competent authorities act on behalf of the member states or the EU when working in 
police matters. These authorities are the EU agencies or bodies, as well as member states 
police, customs and other competent national authorities.97 Only a competent authority 
may use the collected data and only for the purpose for which it was collected. When 
personal data is transferred to another member state, the recipient state must respect the 
restrictions on the exchange which are provided for in the transmitting state´s law.98 The 
recipient may use the data for different purposes than the ones for which the data was 
transmitted.99 The competent authorities must document data transmissions to enable the 
verification of the processing´s lawfulness and to ensure the data security. Data which is 
received from a member state may be transferred to third parties, but only if the first state 
has consented to the transfer. The data may be transferred without having this prior 
consent, if it is necessary to prevent an immediate threat to public security of a state.100 
                                                 
92 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Article 3(2). 
93 EU Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, 27.11.2008. 
94 Convention 108, 1981, Article 2, Definitions and EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2 
Definitions. 
95 EU Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, 27.11.2008, Recital 6 and Article 1(2). 
96 Ibid, Recital 48. 
97 Ibid, Article 2(h). 
98 Ibid, Article 3(1) & 12. 
99 Ibid, Article 11: Personal data received from or made available by the competent authority of another 
member state may, in accordance with the requirements of Article 3(2), be further processed only for the 
following purposes other than those for which they were transmitted or made available: (a) the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties other than 
those for which they were transmitted or made available; (b) other judicial and administrative proceedings 
directly related to the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties; (c) the prevention of an immediate and serious threat to public security; or (d) any other 
purpose only with the prior consent of the transmitting member state or with the consent of the data subject, 
given in accordance with national law. The competent authorities may also further process the transmitted 
personal data for historical, statistical or scientific purposes, provided that member states provide appropriate 
safeguards, such as making the data anonymous. 
100 Ibid, Article 10 & 13. 
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The data subject has the right to be informed of the collection and processing of her 
personal data by the competent authorities. She has the right to access to information about 
her data´s processing, although the access may be restricted on certain grounds such as if it 
is a necessary and proportional measure to avoid preventing investigations. The data 
subject has the right to rectification, erasure or blocking of her personal data. If the data 
subject is prevented from exercising her rights, she must be able to complain to the 
national supervisory authority or to a court. If the data subject is damaged because of 
violations of the national law, she must have access to a judicial remedy.101 
The competent authorities’ take different measures to protect personal data against 
unlawful processing. Naturally, these measures should be regulated in the national 
legislation and such measures are called: the equipment access control, data media control, 
storage control, user control, data access control, communication control, input control, 
recovery, reliability, and integrity.102 Member states must make sure that independent 
national supervisory authorities monitor the application of the rules adopted in accordance 
to this Framework Decision. These supervisors hear the complaints concerning the 
protection of individual’s rights considering the processing of their personal data.103  
In addition to the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, the information exchange 
between the member states public officials is regulated by several instruments.104 The 
                                                 
101 Ibid, Articles 16 - 20. 
102 Ibid, Article 22(2): In respect of automated data processing each Member State shall implement measures 
designed to: (a) deny unauthorized persons access to data-processing equipment used for processing personal 
data (equipment access control); (b) prevent the unauthorized reading, copying, modification or removal of 
data media (data media control); (c) prevent the unauthorized input of data and the unauthorized inspection, 
modification or deletion of stored personal data (storage control); (d) prevent the use of automated data-
processing systems by unauthorized persons using data communication equipment (user control); (e) ensure 
that persons authorized to use an automated data processing system only have access to the data covered by 
their access authorization (data access control); (f) ensure that it is possible to verify and establish to which 
bodies personal data have been or may be transmitted or made available using data communication 
equipment (communication control); (g) ensure that it is subsequently possible to verify and establish which 
personal data have been input into automated data processing systems and when and by whom the data were 
input (input control); (h) prevent the unauthorized reading, copying, modification or deletion of personal data 
during transfers of personal data or during transportation of data media (transport control); (i) ensure that 
installed systems may, in case of interruption, be restored (recovery); (j) ensure that the functions of the 
system perform, that the appearance of faults in the functions is reported (reliability) and that stored data 
cannot be corrupted by means of a malfunctioning of the system (integrity). 
103 Ibid, Article 25. 
104 See for example: the EU Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA on the organisation and content of 
the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member States, OJ 2009 L 93, 
26.2.2009.; and the EU Council Decision 2000/642/JHA, concerning arrangements for cooperation between 
financial intelligence units of the Member States in respect of exchanging information, OJ 2000 L 271, 
17.10.2000. 
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member states may utilize the possibilities provided by legal tools that are established 
between the member states. There are several instruments providing databases to improve 
cooperation and information sharing between the member states national authorities (the 
Prüm Decision105, the Schengen Information System106 and the Visa Information 
System107); as well as institutions assisting in the fight against international crime and 
terrorism (Europol108 and Eurosur109) and to promote judicial cooperation in investigations 
and prosecutions (Eurojust110, the Customs Information System111 and the Eurodac112).  
1.3 Processing personal data and the data protection law principles  
This chapter explains what it means to process personal data, what is the data subject´s 
consent and what are the principles guiding the data processing. The processing of personal 
data is imbalanced and asymmetric between the two actors of information processing: the 
data subject and the data controller. From the data subject´s perspective the amount of 
information that can be gathered is unlimited, just as is the scope of analysis that can be 
done from the data. The collected data can be retained forever.113 
1.3.1 Categories of personal data and the definition of its processing 
To protect a person´s personal data, first this person must be identifiable. If a piece of 
information contains some elements of identification by which a person can be identified 
directly or indirectly, the person can be considered as identifiable.114 Information contains 
                                                 
105 EU Council Decision 2008/615/JHA; Prüm Decision, 23.6.2008. 
106 EU Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, SIS-II, 12.6.2007. 
107 EU Regulation 767/2008, VIS Regulation, 9.7.2008. 
108 EU Council Decision 2009/371/JHA establishing the European Police Office, 6.4.2009. 
109 EU Regulation 1052/2013, Eurosur Regulation, 22.10.2013. 
110 The Eurojust Decisions: EU Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to 
reinforcing the fight against serious crime, OJ 2002 L 63, 28.2.2002; EU Council Decision 2003/659/JHA 
amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious 
crime, OJ 2003 L 44, 18.6.2003 ; EU Council Decision 2009/426/JHA on the strengthening of Eurojust and 
amending Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to reinforcing the fight against serious 
crime, OJ 2009 L 138, 16.12.2008. 
111 EU Council Decision 2009/917/JHA, CIS Decision on the use of information technology for customs 
purposes, OJ 2009 L 323, 30.11.2009. 
112 Eurodac Regulations: EU Regulation 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of Eurodac for the 
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ 2000 L 316, 
11.12.2000 and EU Regulation 407/2002, laying down certain rules to implement Regulation 2725/2000 
concerning the establishment of Eurodac for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of 
the Dublin Convention, OJ 2002 L 62, 28.2.2002. 
113 Nissenbaum, 1998, p. 559, 576. 
114 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2 (a) “'personal data' shall mean any information relating 
to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who can be 
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personal data about a person if this person is identified in it or if she is described in a way 
which makes it possible to find out who she is by conducting further research.115   
"Personal data" connects to the person’s private and professional life. The European data 
protection law protects these both types of information in the same manner.116 The data 
protection law applies irrespective of the form in which the personal data is stored or used. 
Cell samples of human tissue are personal data as they record a person´s DNA.117 Written 
or spoken communications may contain personal data as well as images,118 including 
closed-circuit television footage119 or sound120.  Personal data is sensitive if it may pose a 
risk to the data subject. Sensitive data means data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, religious or other beliefs, or criminal conviction, and data concerning health or 
sexual life. It may be processed only with special safeguards.121   
The ‘processing of personal data’ means any operation taken upon personal data, such as 
“collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making 
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction”122. Data processing 
refers mainly to automated processing, but manual processing may be required between 
automated operations.123 Heikki Partanen divides the automated data processing into two 
main categories: 'direct' processing where the processing begins with identification of the 
data subject, and 'reverse' processing where the idea of the processing is to identify the 
subject. The reverse processing relates to criminal procedures where individual´s actions 
are investigated and the outcomes end up as personal data in the information system.124   
                                                                                                                                                    
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more 
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” 
115 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 39. 
116 ECtHR, No. 27798/95, Amann v. Switzerland, 16.2.2000, para 65; CJEU, Joined cases C-92/09 and C-
93/09, Schecke and Eifert, 9.11.2010, para 59. 
117 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 43. 
118 ECtHR, No. 59320/00, Von Hannover v. Germany, 24.6.2004; ECtHR, No. 50774/99, Sciacca v. Italy, 
11.1.2005. 
119 ECtHR, No. 44647/98, Peck v. UK, 28.1.2003; ECtHR, No. 420/07, Köpke v. Germany, 5.10.2010. 
120 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Recitals 16 and 17; ECtHR, No. 44787/98, P.G. and J.H. v. UK, 
25.9.2001, paras. 59 and 60; ECtHR, No. 71611/01, Wisse v. France, 20.12.2005. 
121 Convention 108, 1981, Article 6; EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Article 8. 
122 Convention 108, 1981, Article 2(B); EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2(C). 
123 Convention 108, 1981, Article 2(C) and EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2(b) and 3(1). 
124 Partanen, 2016, p. 101. 
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The DPD defines the data controller as a person or body who determines the purposes and 
means of the processing of personal data. The processor then processes that data on behalf 
of the controller.125 There may be several separate entities who together act as a data 
controller and process data for a shared purpose.126 This is called joint controllership. The 
controller must specify and clarify the purpose of the processing before it begins.127 She 
must either notify the supervisory authority or document it internally. Every new 
processing purpose must have its own legal basis. The joint controllership provides better 
protection to the data subject´s interests. This results in joint liabilities for damages and 
gives the data subject a wider range of remedies.128  
A data subject´s consent is often the legal basis for data processing. Convention 108 does 
not define the consent, but rather leaves it to domestic law. EU law sets out three elements 
for establishing the validity of a subject´s consent. The data subject must have been under 
no pressure when consenting, she must have been informed of the object and consequences 
of consenting, and the scope of consent must be concrete.129 She must be provided with an 
understandable description of the subject matter,130 and she must re-consent if processing 
operations change in a way which was not foreseeable.131 As an example of data subject´s 
free consent, in many airports the passengers need to go through body scanners to enter the 
boarding area. The scanning might be presented as an option. The passengers agree 
because they try to avoid problems, but the consent is not sufficiently free.132 The DPD 
Article 7(E) provides basis for this: the passengers must cooperate because of an 
overriding public interest. They could choose between scanning and pat-down, but only as 
an additional measure.133  
                                                 
125 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2(D) & (E). See also Section Definitions. 
126 Ibid, Article 17(3) and (4). 
127 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 03/2013, 2.4.2013. 
128 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 10/2006, 22.11.2006 and Article 29 Working Party Opinion 1/2010, 
16.2.2010, p. 25. 
129 EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, Article 2(H); and European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 56. 
130 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 59. 
131 CJEU, C-543/09, Deutsche Telekom, 5.5.2011, paras 53–54. 
132 Article 29 Working Party Opinion 15/2011 , 13.7.2011, p. 15. 
133 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 58. 
27 
 
The E-privacy Directive separates three categories of data created during an electronic 
communication134: 
• The confidential data: constituting the content of the sent messages; 
• The traffic data: necessary for establishing and maintaining the communication, 
information of the communication partners, time and duration of the communication; 
• The location data: within the traffic data, the location of the communication device. 
1.3.2 Data procession must be justified, purposeful and fair 
The justification of processing personal data depends on the purpose of the processing. The 
processing must be explained to the data subject to make sure she understands what 
happens to her data.135 The DPD sets principles for the member states to further ensure that 
personal data is: processed fairly and lawfully; collected for specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes; adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which it is collected and processed; accurate and kept up to date; inaccurate or incomplete 
data will be erased or corrected, and; kept in a form which permits identification of data 
subjects as long as necessary for the purposes for which the data was collected. The data 
stored for historical, statistical or scientific use, must have safeguards.136  
The OECD privacy guidelines recommend that the data controllers should be responsible 
for complying with data protection rules.137 Convention 108 leaves the issue to national 
law and does not refer to the controllers’ accountability, while the DPD states that the 
controllers ensure that the data protection principles are complied with.138 The Article 29 
Working Party states that controllers have an obligation to place measures to guarantee that 
data protection rules are followed in the processing operations and to document those 
measures.139 The data processing must be fair, meaning that it is lawful, transparent and 
the data subjects are informed of the processing. The controllers have an obligation to 
make available to the data subject the copies of her data or to justify by compelling reasons 
for refusing to do so.140 As an example, this violates the ECHR Article 8 if national 
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authorities granted the access to the applicant after five years of delay, when he had 
requested access to a file which the secret service organization had stored on him.141  
Interference with personal data is justified if it is based on a national law provision which 
is accessible to the data subjects and its effects are foreseeable.142 The Charter Article 52 
allows limitations on the processing of personal data. The Union law may provide more 
extensive protection and the ECHR Article 8(2) sets the minimum requirements for the 
lawful limitations of the right to data protection.143 The requirements for justifiable 
interference are explained in the chapter 2.1, in relation to the case law of the ECtHR.    
The retention of personal data must be proportionate compared to the purpose of collection 
and should be limited in time, especially in the police matters.144 This means that the data 
collected of a suspected criminal can be stored as long as the controller has legal basis for 
collecting it and justification for the suspicion. Data, which is no longer needed, could be 
stored by anonymizing or pseudonymizing it as the time limitation applies only to personal 
data which is kept in a form which allows identification of data subjects.145 Personal data 
can be kept in a personalized form after it no longer serves its original purpose, on grounds 
of using it on historical, statistical, or scientific purposes.146 Personal data is anonymized 
by eliminating the identifying elements from it so the re-identification of the person is no 
longer possible.147 Anonymized data is not personal data. In pseudonymization of personal 
data, one pseudonym replaces the identifiers, for example by encrypting the identifiers. 
This way personal data with encrypted identifiers can be used in many contexts, i.e. where 
researchers study crimes and the authorities aim to keep secret the criminals.148 
Pseudonymized data is not directly mentioned in the DPD or Convention 108. 
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1.4 Conclusion of the section 1 
This section defined the different categories of personal data and the main principles for 
data processing. Basically, the processing must be justified, purposeful and fair. Often the 
data subject´s consent is the legal basis for legitimate processing. In relation to data 
processing conducted by competent authorities, the consent does not provide legal basis for 
the processing as the data subject is required to comply with a legal obligation. 
To conclude the first section, it can already now be mentioned that the European 
legislation regarding the rights to the protection of personal data and privacy is well 
spread. These fundamental rights are primarily written in the main treaties of the EU as 
well as in the Charter. The EU tries to cover the field in practice by the DPD and several 
other instruments complementing it, although the DPD does not apply to the area of 
national police matters, which is the main focusing point of this paper. The EU does have 
the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA covering this field when personal data is 
transferred from one member state to another. Currently Convention 108 and the CoE Data 
Police Recommendation guiding the Convention´s application are the only European 
instruments able to be applied to the work of national authorities. This will be changed in 
the future via the EU data protection reform. Because the technology has developed since 
the adoption of the DPD, the EU Commission proposed a data protection reform package 
in 2012. It consisted of a proposal for a GDPR149 to replace the DPD, and of a new Data 
Protection Directive on Police Matters150. The idea of the new Directive is to replace the 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA and to extend the data protection principles to 
domestic police matters. The reform will be introduced in section 3. Before that we must 
go through section 2. 
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2 THE EUROPEAN COURTS´ TRENDS ON DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY   
This section introduces recent decisions of the European Courts which concern the right to 
the protection of personal data and the right to privacy. The first chapter lists the ECtHR 
rulings which have guided the understanding of personal data protection in relation to the 
right to respect for private life. These ECtHR cases will clarify some of the key principles 
of data protection. They will go through the requirements of necessary safeguards, clarify 
the rule of law and brighten the balances between the private and public interests and in the 
end, take a stand on how much a state may interfere with individual´s fundamental rights. 
The second chapter then turns to the CJEU rulings on the same issues. The CJEU cases are 
relatively recent as those derive their reasoning from the ECtHR and operate as a 
continuum to it. The CJEU cases focus on the Court´s approach to the Charter, as for long 
it was referring only to the ECHR but then transformed itself relying on to the Charter. The 
third chapter introduces the doctrine of margin of appreciation in Europe. 
When evaluating the CJEU´s rulings on human rights issues, it is necessary to look at the 
ECtHR decisions. Firstly, because the Charter states that it reaffirms the fundamental rights 
as they result from the constitutional traditions and international obligations common to the 
member states, as well as from the EU´s primary law, the ECHR, the Social Charters 
adopted by the Community and the CoE, and the case law of both Courts (the CJEU and 
the ECtHR).151 Secondly, because the CJEU leans on the ECtHR´s interpretations as can 
be seen in this section. These Courts approach the same themes from different angles. The 
ECtHR evaluates actions conducted towards an individual while the CJEU evaluates the 
law itself. The CJEU has not dealt a case where it would have discussed questions of data 
protection and the right to privacy and then balanced these with the actions of national 
authorities´ rights regulated by the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.152  
2.1 The ECtHR´s recent rulings on right to privacy and data protection 
This chapter will focus on the ECtHR´s judgements concerning the right to the protection 
of personal data and the respect of private life. The ECHR Article 8153 grants everyone the 
right to respect for private life. As mentioned in the chapter 1.2 the ECHR does not 
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regulate the right to data protection, but instead Convention 108 does on a general level 
and the CoE Police Data Recommendation154 guides.  
2.1.1 National legislation must provide safeguards against abuse 
The first so called landmark decision on this field by the ECtHR is the case Klass and 
Others v. Germany155. The applicants complained that German law violated their right to 
respect for private and family life (ECHR Article 8), as it allowed the national authorities 
to secretly survey individuals' mail, post and telecommunication, the data subject was not 
notified of the surveillance and she was not able to question the measures in the national 
Courts. The rule of law demands that interference by the public authorities with an 
individual's rights is subject to effective supervision. It must be carried out by the 
judiciary.156 
The ECtHR agreed that the surveillance interfered with the applicant´s rights. The main 
question was whether that interference was justified under ECHR Article 8(2), which 
provides an exception to the right but it should be interpreted narrowly. The Court stated 
that terrorism threatens states, so they must be able to undertake the secret surveillance of 
revolutionary elements to counter such threats. The powers of secret surveillance of 
citizens can be tolerated only as far as is strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic 
institutions. The states cannot adopt whatever measures they find appropriate, even to fight 
against terrorism. There must exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuses.157 
The Court found that the system was justified in the interests of national security and to 
prevent disorder and crime. The legislation provided adequate safeguards and conditions 
before a surveillance measure could be ordered.158  
The national security interests may prevail over the individual´s interests as can be seen in 
the case Leander v. Sweden159. In 1979, Mr. Leander applied to work at the Naval Museum 
in Sweden, which was partly located in a naval base. The person to be hired had to go 
through a security check by the security police. Mr. Leander was rejected because of the 
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outcome of the background check. He then complained as he did not know what 
information was released from the secret police-register and he did not have any access to 
the stored data.160 The ECtHR found that the aim of the background check was legitimate 
for the protection of national security. The interference was based on a national law, it was 
necessary in a democratic society and foreseeable. The Court explained that the 
interference must correspond to a pressing social need and that it is proportionate to the 
aimed legitimate goal. The national authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in this 
matter. In view of the risk that a system of secret surveillance for the protection of national 
security poses of undermining democracy on the ground of defending it, there must exist 
effective guarantees against abuse. In such case, national security may prevail over the 
individual interests.161 
The evaluation of the adequacy of the safeguards is done on a case by case basis. The 
ECtHR stated this in the case called Uzun v. Germany.162 The German authorities had 
suspected two individuals for their involvement in bomb attacks and surveyed them by 
placing a GPS device into the other man´s car. Mr. Uzun was found guilty of bomb attacks 
based on the evidence collected through that surveillance. He complained to the Federal 
Constitutional Court that his privacy was infringed, that there was no effective judicial 
control of this measure and the use of several means of surveillance at the same time need 
a separate basis in law.163 
Because of the risk of abuse that is natural to any secret surveillance system, such 
measures must be based on a law that is particularly precise, especially as the available 
technology is becoming more sophisticated. The rule of law requires that there exist 
effective guarantees against abuse and the national law gives adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference with ECHR Article 8 rights. This assessment depends on all the 
circumstances of the case. These include: the measure´s nature, scope and duration; the 
grounds required for ordering them; the authority who is competent to allow, perform and 
supervise the measure; and the kind of remedy the national law provides. Investigation 
measures taken by different authorities must be coordinated. The Court found that the 
safeguards were adequate and effective: the surveillance measure was time-limited, it was 
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ordered by a Public Prosecutor and its extensions would have been subject to a domestic 
court´s review with respect to the proportionality principle. The measures were to protect 
national security, public safety and the rights of the victims, and to prevent crime. They 
were proportionate: the GPS surveillance was ordered after less intrusive methods proved 
insufficient, it lasted for a short period and affected the applicant only when he was in his 
accomplice’s car (It was not total and comprehensive).164  
2.1.2 Clarity of the rule of law includes accessibility, foreseeability and precision 
When a national authority holds inaccurate personal data, the data subject should be able to 
correct it. In the case called Rotaru v. Romania the applicant complained of an 
infringement of his right to privacy as the Romanian Intelligence Service held personal 
data of him which contained wrong information, which the authorities had used, and it was 
impossible to correct the data.165 The ECtHR stated that the storing of applicant´s 
information, it´s usage, and a refusal to allow him to correct it, interfered with his right to 
privacy. Such interference must be in accordance with the law, pursue a legitimate aim 
under the ECHR Article 8(2) and be necessary to reach that aim. The measure should have 
basis in national law and the law should be accessible to the person concerned, and its 
effects should be foreseeable. A rule must be precise to enable any individual to regulate 
her actions.166 The secret surveillance systems must provide safeguards established by law 
which apply to the supervision of the relevant services' activities.167  
The ECtHR discussed the foreseeability of the domestic law in the case Malone v. UK.168 
Mr. Malone was charged with offences relating to dishonest handling of stolen goods. 
During the trial, it turned out that a telephone conversation, to which he had been a party, 
was intercepted by the police on the authority of a warrant. He complained that the tapping 
of his conversations without his consent was unlawful even if done with a warrant.169 The 
ECtHR repeated the definition of "law" from the case Silver and Others v. UK: Firstly, the 
law must be accessible - the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in 
the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a certain case; Secondly, a norm is not 
                                                 
164 Ibid, paras 60-81. 
165 ECtHR, No. 28341/95, Rotaru v. Romania, 4.5.2000, paras 1 - 25. 
166 Ibid, paras 46, 48, 52 & 55. 
167 Ibid, paras 59 - 63. 
168 ECtHR, No. 8691/79, Malone v. UK, 2.8.1984. 
169 Ibid, paras 12 - 18. 
34 
 
law unless it enables the citizen to regulate her conduct - she must be able to foresee the 
consequences of an action.170 The Court recognized the special nature of police 
investigations and the risk of arbitrariness when the police´s power is exercised in secret. 
The ECHR requirements cannot be the same when intercepting communications for police 
investigations as they are in other contexts. The law does not have to be such that an 
individual can foresee when his communications are going to be intercepted. But it must 
give an indication of the conditions when authorities may secretly interfere with their 
rights. The law must clarify the scope and manner of exercise of the executive´s legal 
discretion to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.171 
National measures which interfere with individual´s fundamental rights must be based on a 
law that is precise. The ECtHR dealt with this issue in the case Kruslin v. France172. In 
1985 Mr. Kruslin was brought before French Court. One of the evidences was a secretly 
recorded telephone conversation in which he had participated. Mr. Kruslin complained of 
violation invoking ECHR Article 8. One feature the ECtHR noticed was that the authorities 
had increased secret measures, like telephone tapping, because of development of serious 
crime.173 Secret measures must be based on detailed provisions as the technology is 
becoming more sophisticated. The French Government stated that the law had seventeen 
safeguards which related either to the carrying out the measure or to the usage of the 
results. The ECtHR found them as only partly written to the legislation and the rest was out 
of individual´s access. Also, there was no rule which would oblige a judge to set a limit on 
the duration of tapping and there was no definition of the nature of crimes which may give 
rise to such an order, or when the recordings must be erased. The Court found that the 
national practice lacked clarity and necessary regulatory control.174  
2.1.3 Interference with private life should be restricted to only what is necessary 
A measure which interferes with an individual´s fundamental right may be necessary to 
enable the protection of others´ rights and the public interest. In the Köpke175 case the 
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applicant, a supermarket cashier, was fired from her job for theft. Her employer had run a 
secret video surveillance operation. The conducts of the applicant and her colleague were 
secretly recorded at their workplace. The collected images were examined by fellow 
employees and used in the proceedings at the German Courts.176 The ECtHR stated that the 
interference with privacy was restricted to what was necessary. The surveillance had been 
carried out after losses had been detected. The measure was targeted to only two suspected 
workers. It was limited in time and covered only public places. The data was not disclosed 
to outsiders and it was used only for the termination of her employment and in the Courts. 
The ECtHR mentioned that the balance which the authorities had struck between the 
interests at issue is not the only way for them to comply with their obligations under the 
ECHR. In the future, these competing interests may get different weights as new 
technologies enable more extensive intrusions into private lives.177  
Storage of personal data in a blanket and indiscriminate nature is unnecessary, especially if 
there is no difference between the treatments of innocent persons to the convicted ones. 
The ECtHR dealt a case called S. and Marper v. UK178, where the issue was whether the 
retention of the personal data of the applicants was necessary, as those persons had been 
suspected of criminal offences, but not convicted. The applicants´ personal biometric data 
(meaning fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles) was stored by the UK police, 
the domestic law allowed an unlimited retention, and the acquitted persons were not able to 
request deletion of their data.179 
The ECtHR noted that the domestic legislation cannot provide for every eventuality. The 
required level of precision depends on the content of the instrument in question, the field it 
covers and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed. Detailed rules are 
necessary to govern the scope and application of measures, as well as minimum safeguards 
concerning duration, storage, usage, third parties´ access, procedures for guarding the 
integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for its destruction. These provide 
sufficient guarantees against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness.180 
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The Court reasoned that the UK is in the vanguard of the development of the use of DNA 
samples in the detection of crime. The other CoE member states have set limits on the 
retention and use of such data to achieve a proper balance with the competing interests. 
The protection provided by the ECHR Article 8 would be unacceptably weakened if the 
use of modern scientific techniques in the criminal-justice system were allowed at any cost. 
The possible benefits of the use of these techniques must be balanced against privacy 
interests. The consensus among the CoE states in this respect narrows the margin of 
appreciation left to the UK to set the permissible limits of the interference with privacy. A 
state which is acting as a pioneer in the development of new technologies bears special 
responsibility for striking the right balance in this regard.181  
The Court stated that the legitimate interest in the prevention of serious crime might 
outweigh the interests of the individuals and the community in protecting personal data. 
But the Court was "struck by the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the power of 
retention" in the UK. The data could be stored irrespective of the nature of the suspected 
offence or of the age of the suspected person; the retention was not time-limited; there was 
only limited possibilities for an acquitted individual to have the data removed from the 
database; and there is no provision for independent review of the justification for the 
retention. The Court ruled that such practice interfered disproportionately with the 
applicant´s privacy and was not necessary in a democratic society.182 It creates a vicious 
circle when the authorities use secret surveillance techniques to combat serious crime. At 
the same time individuals develop data-protection means to prevent unauthorized parties, 
including authorities, to access their data.183  
2.2 The CJEU´s recent rulings on right to privacy and data protection 
This chapter introduces recent judgements by the CJEU concerning the protection of the 
privacy and personal data. Before 2000, the CJEU had recognized rights which 
corresponded to those of the ECHR, while considering the member states´ constitutional 
traditions. By adopting the Charter the EU shifted from a unitary system of recognition of 
applicable fundamental rights to a structurally binary one. This created legal uncertainty. 
First, the Charter and the ECHR do not have identical provisions on rights or on their 
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limitations. Secondly, the Charter was not binding in the beginning. Thirdly, the Charter 
did promote new rights.184 The protection of personal data in national investigative 
authorities’ work is not currently regulated at the EU level, except what falls under the 
scope of the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. The CJEU has not yet referred 
to this instrument. That is why the following cases circulate around the topic of the thesis 
as they are trying to find trends from the Court´s rulings to predict how the Court will 
respond when the data protection reform instruments begin to apply in 2018. The cases are 
in a chronological order due to the change of CJEU´s approach towards the Charter. 
2.2.1 CJEU on protection of personal data before 2009 
In 2008 the CJEU referred for the first time to the Charter and recognized the existence of 
a right to personal data protection in the Promusicae case.185 The Court used the Charter to 
identify a fundamental right which had never been recognized as integral to the general 
principles of EU law, even though the Charter was not yet legally binding.186 In 2008 the 
Charter already existed but the Union courts still had to consider the ECtHR case law when 
dealing with fundamental rights issues. The CJEU found it possible to refer to the Charter 
Article 8 as there was a mention of the Article in the preamble of the E-Privacy 
Directive187. The Promusicae case was about various EU provisions whether they required 
member states to lay down an obligation to communicate personal data to ensure effective 
protection of copyright in the context of civil proceedings. The Court stated that the 
Charter’s Article 7 “substantially reproduces” the ECHR Article 8, and the Charter Article 
8 “expressly proclaims the right to protection of personal data”.188 The recognition of the 
right to personal data protection in the Charter’s Article 8 did not influence the reasoning 
of the Court´s judgment. Instead the Court considered the right to data protection as 
classified under the right to respect for private life.189  
In 2008 the CJEU dealt with a case called Satamedia190 which concerned a reference to the 
DPD. The Court stated that the DPD´s objective, to protect individuals´ fundamental rights 
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and their right to privacy, must be matched with the right to freedom of expression.191 The 
Advocate General´s opinion in the case shows the connection between the CJEU and the 
ECtHR judgements on human rights questions. The Advocate General noticed the 
existence of the Charter´s protection of personal data but stated that the Union courts must 
consider the ECtHR case law when dealing with fundamental rights issues.192 
In 2009 the CJEU discussed the individual´s right to have access to her personal data in the 
case called Rijkeboer.193 Mr. Rijkeboer had asked a College in Rotterdam to give 
information about the disclosure of his personal data to third parties from the last two 
years. The College gave him information only for one of the years.194 In its judgement, the 
CJEU did not refer to the Charter or to the right to the protection of personal data. The 
Court pointed out that the right to privacy was written in DPD Article 1 and its importance 
was mentioned in the preamble. The right to privacy suggested that the data subject may be 
sure that his personal data is processed in a correct and lawful manner, which requires that 
his data is accurate and disclosed only to authorized recipients.195 This reasoning refers to 
the ECHR Article 8 but the CJEU linked it to the right of access established by the DPD.196 
The Advocate General stated in his opinion that the right to privacy had found its 
legislative expression in the DPD, the provisions of which were codified in the Charter 
Article 8.197 
2.2.2 CJEU on data protection after 2009 
Since 2009, after the Charter received its legally binding status, the CJEU attempted to 
place the new Charter Article 8 right into the previous case law, which had been marked by 
a connection between the EU´s personal data protection and the ECHR Article 8. The case 
Schecke and Eifert198 shows the Court´s willingness to begin ruling based on the Charter 
while at the same time using the ECHR and the ECtHR´s case law. The CJEU stated that 
                                                 
191 CJEU, C-73/07, Satamedia, 16.12.2008, para. 52-56. 
192 CJEU, C-73/07, Opinion of advocate General Kokott, on case Satamedia, 8.5.2008, paras 37 & 40. 
193 CJEU, C-553/07, Rijkeboer, 7.5.2009. 
194 Ibid, para 4. 
195 Ibid, paras 46-49. 
196 Fuster, 2014, p. 229. And CJEU, C-553/07, Rijkeboer, 7.5.2009, para 50. 
197 CJEU, C-553/07, Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, on case Rijkeboer, 22.12.2008, 
paras 8 & 20. About the Charter, see Chapter 1.2.1.2. 
198 CJEU, Joined cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Schecke and Eifert, 9.11.2010. 
39 
 
the TEU Article 6(1)199 gives the Charter the same value as the Treaties. The validity of 
the rules in question had to be evaluated based on the Charter and Charter Article 8(1) 
gives everyone the right to the protection of personal data. The Court saw this right as 
closely connected to the Charter Article 7 right to respect for private life.200 It combined 
the Charter Articles 7 and 8 to create an unprecedented right, the right to respect for private 
life regarding the processing of personal data. It describes the right to data protection as 
provided by Charter Article 8(1) allowing it to act in tandem with the rules set out in 
Charter Articles 8(2) and 52(1), and the ECHR Article 8(2).201 The Advocate General 
considered in her opinion that the two rights referred to in the case were the right to respect 
for private life by the ECHR Article 8 and the right to data protection by Convention 108, 
and that these rights were similar to the Charter Articles 7 and 8.202 
In the case called Scarlet203 the CJEU for the first time made its main reference to Charter 
Article 8. An Internet Service Provider (ISP) company Scarlet Extended SA was forced to 
implement a system for filtering and blocking electronic communications. The Court was 
asked to interpret EU law referring to the ECHR Article 8 (respect of private life) and 
Article 10204 (freedom of expression). The Advocate General advised the Court to interpret 
the Charter in the light of the ECHR. The ECHR Article 8 corresponds to the Charter 
Articles 7 and 8 and the ECHR Article 10 corresponds to the Charter Article 11.205 The 
Charter rights need to be interpreted similarly with the ECHR.206 The Advocate General 
prioritized the Charter to interpret the EU data protection laws. It linked them to both the 
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right to protection of personal data and the right to respect for private life and not only to 
the right to the protection of personal data.207 The Court focused on the fact that the 
question was about protection of the right to intellectual property and this right´s protection 
must be balanced against other fundamental rights.208 The system for filtering and blocking 
electronic communications might violate the customer´s rights to protection of their 
personal data and freedom to receive or impart information protected by the Charter.209  
In 2011 at the Deutsche Telekom210 case the CJEU claimed for the first time that the 
purpose of the DPD is to ensure the right to protection of personal data.211 The Court stated 
that the E-Privacy Directive clarifies and supplements the DPD. The Charter Article 8(2) 
allows the processing of personal data if conditions are met (fairly, for specified purposes 
and based on the consent of the person concerned, or another legitimate basis).212 
Then in October 2012 the CJEU turned more towards the Union´s own legislation. In the 
CJEU case Commission v Austria213 the question was about the independence of an 
Austrian data protection authority. The Court found that processing of personal data has to 
be subjected to control by an independent authority and this is based on the primary law of 
the EU, the Charter Article 8(3) and the TFEU Article 16(2).214 
2.2.3 Data retention must be balanced to the aim pursued 
The CJEU and the ECtHR have similar approaches to the requirement of safeguards on 
measures interfering with an individual´s fundamental rights. In the case of Digital Rights 
Ireland, which was a joined case, the CJEU had to examine the validity of the Data 
Retention Directive 2006/24/EC215 in the light of the Charter Articles 7 and 8 and the 
question of the validity of the Directive.216 The first case refers to a situation when Digital 
Rights (Irish digital rights lobbying group) asked the national court to declare the invalidity 
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of the Data Retention Directive and part of a national law. These require the providers of 
telephone communications services to retain users´ traffic and location data to prevent and 
investigate crime and to protect state security. The second case asked whether the Data 
Retention Directive complies with the Charter as it allows the retention of data in relation 
to an unlimited number of persons for a long time. The retention mainly affects persons 
whose actions do not justify the retention of their data.217 
The EU legislation which deals with interference of fundamental rights, must lay down 
clear and precise rules to set minimum safeguards. These must also govern the scope and 
application of a measure and the need for safeguards is greater when personal data is 
processed automatically. The protection of the right to privacy requires limitations in 
relation to the protection of personal data to apply only as far as strictly necessary. This is 
not fulfilled by legislation which authorizes to retain all personal data which has been 
transferred from the EU to the US. The legislation should have differentiation, limitation or 
exception in light of the aimed objective. The purposes must be specific, restricted and 
justify the interference with that data.218 The Court did not rule that the general retention 
was illegal as such but it is against it and found the Data Retention Directive to be invalid. 
The judgement listed 13 problems in the Directive which are either reasons for annulment 
or requirements for the retention to be proportionate.219 The Directive does not have clear 
rules governing the scope of the interference with the rights of the Charter. It does not have 
rules which would be adapted to the huge amount of data which it orders to be retained, 
nor rules to secure the data to ensure integrity and confidentiality, nor does it oblige the 
member states to provide these rules.220  
The EU Commission will not propose a new Data Retention Directive but it monitors the 
legislative developments´ at a national level. After the Digital Rights Ireland decision, 
some states adopted new laws which are similar to the annulled Data Retention Directive 
and some remained with their old laws. If the Commission acts politically and refrains 
from acting in case of an infringement, it prevents the Charter from protecting privacy.221 
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2.2.4 General access to the content of communications violates privacy  
Legislation which allows the authorities to access to the content of electronic 
communications on a generalized basis violates the core of the right to privacy. When 
personal data is transferred to a third country, an adequate level of protection of privacy 
must be ensured. In the CJEU case Schrems222, Mr. Schrems had complained to the Irish 
Data Protection Commissioner about the fact that Facebook Ireland Ltd transfers every 
Facebook user´s personal data to the mother company in the USA. The transfers were 
conducted under the Safe Harbour Arrangement223. Mr. Schrems asked the Irish 
Commissioner to prohibit Facebook Ireland from transferring his personal data to the US. 
He claimed that the law and practice in the US does not protect personal data adequately 
against the public authorities´ surveillance activities. The Commission refused to 
investigate the matter.224  
The question in the case regarded sending personal data from an EU member state to a 
third country under the DPD Article 25225: personal data may be transmitted from a 
member state to a third country if the receiving state ensures adequate protection of the 
data. Article 25(2) states that the adequacy of the protection is assessed “in the light of all 
the circumstances surrounding a data transfer”. The circumstances considered in the 
assessment are listed in the DPD and the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA: to 
the nature of the certain data, the processing´s duration and purpose, the data´s state of 
origin and the state of destination, the complied with professional rules and security 
measures in the third country and the rules of law in force.226 
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The CJEU spent roughly two-thirds of its decision on the question of the supervisory 
authority´s powers.227 The Court noted that the national supervisory authorities monitor the 
compliance with the EU rules concerning the protection of individuals when their personal 
data is processed. The supervisory authorities have the powers to check whether a transfer 
of personal data from its own member state to a third country complies with the DPD´s 
requirements, and they are obliged to investigate the complaints.228  
The Court stated that the adequate level of protection requires the third country to ensure, 
by its domestic law or its international commitments, a level of protection of rights and 
freedoms that is “essentially equivalent”229 to that guaranteed within the EU. It does not 
have to be identical. The Advocate General added in her opinion that the Commission must 
also examine the way that the third country protects the personal data in practice.230 The 
CJEU underlined that if the authorities have general access to the content of electronic 
communications, it compromises the essence of the right to privacy.231 The English version 
of the judgement uses the term “compromises the essence”, while the Finnish translation 
uses a sterner term. It states that such access “violates” (in Finnish “loukkaa”). 
The Court refrained from being political however, as it did not look at the national US 
legislation. Instead it noted that the Safe Harbor Arrangement itself does not limit the 
interference with the fundamental rights of the persons whose data is transferred from the 
EU to the US.232 The US authorities can process that data in a way which is against the 
purposes for which it was transferred, and more than is proportionate to protect national 
security. The Charter is the key when evaluating the compliance of the requirements laid 
down in the DPD, along with the interference of fundamental rights. The data transfers 
under the Arrangement are invalid.233 There were three things lacking in terms of legal 
remedies, of regular monitoring in the U.S., and of balance between a nation’s interests and 
fundamental rights.234 
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2.2.5 Retained data needs a relationship with the threat to public security 
In 2016 the CJEU stated that the retention of personal data to fight against serious crimes 
should happen because that data has a connection with a crime. In the Case Tele2 Sverige 
AB235 the company Tele2 (a provider of electronic communications services) was required 
to retain traffic and location data of its users under the Data Retention Directive236, but not 
the content of those communications. The retained data makes it possible to identify the 
communication equipment and to establish its location, to identify the communication´s 
date, time, duration and type, and to track the source of the communication and its 
destination.237 Tele2 stated that it will cease to retain the data because of the CJEU 
decision Digital Rights Ireland. The Swedish police complained about Tele2´s conduct and 
a Swedish Court requested for a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. The CJEU dealt with 
the question whether a general obligation to retain everyone´s traffic data without 
distinctions, limitations or exceptions to fight crime, is compatible with the E-Privacy 
Directive Article 15(1)238, taking into account the Charter Articles 7, 8 and 52(1).239 The 
Court stated that the list in the E-Privacy Directive Article 15 is exhaustive, and that 
measures may derogate from the principle of confidentiality "to safeguard national 
security — that is, State security — defence, public security, and the prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences…"240. 
The Court stated that the protection of the right to respect for private life requires that 
derogations from and limitations on the protection of personal data apply only to what is 
strictly necessary. The retention of data should be an exception, and national legislation 
which makes the retention of data a rule on a general basis exceeds these limits and is not 
justified. There must be a relationship between the retained data and a threat to public 
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security. The action must be based on evidence of a certain individual whose data might 
expose a link with serious crimes and to help to fight these crimes or prevent a risk to 
public security.241 The national retention measure must have clear rules regarding the 
circumstances when the electronic communications services provider must give the 
national authorities access to the data. With the objective of fighting serious crimes, access 
may be given to only the data of individuals who are suspected of being involved in a 
serious crime. The authorities´ request to access should be reviewed by an independent 
body before the access.242 
2.3 The margin of appreciation in Europe 
The term “margin of appreciation” refers to the freedom of action a government enjoys 
when it evaluates factual situations and applies the rules of treaties.243 This chapter shall 
introduce how it was formulated in the ECtHR´s case law and how the CJEU has 
approached the issue in relation to data protection. The ECtHR allows states to have a 
degree of discretion when it acts in the area of an ECHR right, when the Court has to 
consider if that state has breached the ECHR. This doctrine is called the margin of 
appreciation and the ECtHR developed it through its case-law. The ECtHR recognizes that 
member states interpret the ECHR differently based on their legal and cultural traditions. 
The margin of appreciation enables the Court to balance the sovereignty of member states 
with their obligations under the Convention.244  
The margin of appreciation given to the member states can be either narrow or wide, 
depending of the case at hand and the rights and freedoms involved. The margin is usually 
considered as narrow when the question is of a person’s identity or existence245. If the 
member states are not able to form a consensus on certain issues the ECtHR may consider 
that the matter is best left to individual states.246 The margin of appreciation is wide when 
the aim is to protect national security.247 It is also wide if the member states have not 
formed a consensus on the issue at question and what would be the best way to protect it, 
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as well as if the member state must balance between competing interests or ECHR 
rights.248 The CoE member states do not have a common agreement as to what the "state 
security" means as it depends on national policies.249  
It is for the national Courts to primarily interpret and apply the domestic law and the 
ECtHR should not rule on whether a national measure complies with national law.250 The 
national authorities are in principle in a better position than an international judge to give 
an opinion of the necessity to restrict (for an example) the freedom of expression to protect 
public morals.251 A serious reason must exist before public authorities may interfere in an 
area covered by ECHR Article 8, where private life is at stake.252  
The doctrine is recognized in CJEU practice, which has applied it in number of areas and it 
has developed jurisprudence involving the protection of fundamental rights. The CJEU has 
applied the doctrine frequently for interpreting the public security exception, for example 
in relation to the freedom of movement of workers253. The Court has recognized that these 
exceptions must be read similarly to the limitation clauses of ECHR Articles 8-11.254 The 
EU member states may use personal data for, among other aspects, the prevention of an 
immediate threat to public security.255 The national authorities may interfere with person´s 
fundamental rights if it is based on national security and public interest requirements. To 
establish the existence of an interference with privacy, it does not matter if the data is 
sensitive or if the data subject suffers because of that interference.256 In the CJEU case 
Tele2 Sverige AB257, the Court dealt with a matter in which one party of the case was a 
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national investigative authority. The Court did not evaluate the authority´s actions but 
rather EU law and the national law based on that EU law. This is because national law and 
national authorities´ actions are within the sovereignty of the state. In the future, the 
adoption of the Data Protection Directive on Police Matters is likely to change this 
situation, as it will step into the member states´ sovereignty. 
2.4 Conclusion of the section 2 
This section introduced influential cases of both Courts and their findings on questions 
relating to the protection of personal data and its connection to the right to respect for 
private life. Basically, the question was usually about balancing these rights when they are 
in conflict with some actions conducted by the public authorities. In conclusion, these 
cases laid out some of the key principles of data protection in practice.  
The authorities may interfere with an individual´s fundamental right when fighting crimes, 
but states cannot adopt whatever measures they find appropriate. Already in 1990, the 
national authorities justified their actions by the increase of serious crimes and the ECtHR 
explained its reasoning with the development of surveillance technology258. 30 years later 
the problem is still the same. The authorities fight against terrorism and the name of the 
game is to balance between two interests: the protection of fundamental rights and national 
security. It is left to the discretion of EU member states to adopt legislation on this matter. 
Some states are more protective of the privacy, others more willing to protect national 
security.259 The Courts have been prudent with new technologies which enable wider 
possibilities for the authorities to interfere with individuals´ privacy. 
The interference is justified and in accordance with the law if it is based on a national 
provision which is precise, accessible to the concerned persons and its effects are 
foreseeable – so an individual can regulate her conduct based on it. The required level of 
precision depends on the subject matter. The law must have clear rules to govern the scope 
and application of interfering measures. It must have minimum safeguards concerning, 
inter alia, duration, storage, usage, third parties´ access, procedures for guarding the 
integrity and confidentiality of data and procedures for its destruction. The interference 
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must refer to a pressing social need and be proportionate to the pursued legitimate aim. The 
data subject must be able to rely on that her data is processed in a lawful manner and 
disclosed only to the authorized recipients. If there are faults in her data, she must be able 
to fix it. Retained personal data must have at least some kind of a relationship to public 
security. The need for safeguards is greater when personal data is processed automatically.  
The CJEU has based its reasoning of the right to data protection and the right privacy to 
the interpretations of the ECtHR. That is why the CJEU cases in this section focused on 
explaining the evolution of the Charter´s role in relation to these rights in question. The 
Union courts must consider the ECtHR case law when dealing with fundamental rights 
issues.260 In the beginning the CJEU did not mention the Charter in its rulings but focused 
only on the ECHR. Then it began to find ways to refer to it and in 2009 when the Charter 
acquired the status of primary EU law, the CJEU began to move towards the Charter and in 
2016 it became the key instrument in interpreting the rights to data protection and privacy. 
In the ECHR system, Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) guarantees 
data protection and this right must be applied while recognizing the scope of other 
competing rights. Both Courts have ruled in several judgements that it is necessary to 
exercise balance with other rights when applying the ECHR Article 8 and Charter Article 
8.261 These are the right to the freedom of expression262, to the freedom of arts and 
sciences263 and to the protection of property264, among others. As this is not in the focus of 
this thesis, these conflicts are not going to be dealt more. 
                                                 
260 CJEU, C-73/07, Opinion of advocate General Kokott, on case Satamedia, 8.5.2008, para 40. 
261 See for an example the decisions: ECtHR, No. 40660/08 and 60641/08, Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 
2) [GC], 7.2.2012; CJEU, Joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos 
Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF) & Federación de Comercio Electrónico y Marketing Directo (FECEMD) v. 
Administración del Estado, 24.11.2011, para 48.; CJEU, C-275/06, Promusicae, 29.1.2008, para. 68. 
262 CJEU, C-73/07, Satamedia, 16.12.2008; ECtHR, No. 39954/08, Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], 
7.2.2012, and ECtHR, No. 40660/08 and 60641/08, Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2) [GC], 7.2.2012. 
263 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 2014, p. 30, and ECtHR, No. 
10737/84, Müller and Others v. Switzerland, 24.5.1988. 
264 ECtHR, No. 36769/08, Ashby Donald and others v. France, 10.1.2013. 
49 
 
3 FUTURE CHANGES OF THE EU’S POLICE DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
This section introduces how the EU´s legislation on data protection is changing in police 
matters. The Data protection reform, as it is called, is on its way in the EU. The Union has 
adopted the GDPR265 and the Data Protection Directive on Police Matters266, and they both 
will come into force in May 2018. As explained in the introduction, this thesis focuses on 
the Data Protection Directive on Police Matters which is currently being implemented in 
the member states.  
The main question of this thesis is if the forthcoming Data Protection Directive on Police 
Matters ensures protection for individual´s right to privacy when the national public 
officials process her personal data. It will not be answered yet. This section explains how 
the rights of the national authorities to process personal data are changing, how privacy is 
being protected in the changing data protection legislation, and finally the Data Protection 
Directive on Police Matters will be introduced. 
The data protection legislation needed development as the EU had to react to the challenge 
posed by the increasing exchange of personal data and the need to protect the privacy. The 
CJEU has stated that the DPD´s objectives are to ensure that the individuals´ rights and 
freedoms are being protected when their personal data is processed, that the processing is 
uniform in member states and that the national laws ensure protection. The harmonization 
of the laws aimed to be complete.267 This aim did not fully work in the real life and the 
Union needed a data protection reform.  
3.1 The writing process of the Data Protection Directive on Police Matters 
This chapter will explain the writing process of the new Data Protection Directive on 
Police Matters in detail and the main changes the Directive will bring along with it. This 
chapter explains also why the Directive was necessary and what characteristics it has. 
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3.1.1 Steps towards the Data Protection Directive on police matters 
The road towards the new Data Protection Directive on Police Matters has been long and 
interesting after the DPD was adopted in 1995. It took 15 years for the EU Commission to 
announce its aim to propose a revision of the EU legal framework for data protection. After 
the 9/11 attack in US in 2001, the EU Parliament was requesting the adoption of a 
horizontal legal instrument like the DPD for the third pillar, the area of freedom security 
and justice, for many years without success. The Parliament had also attempted to 
authorize the data protection authorities in relation with the third pillar policies, but with 
limited success.268 Convention 108 stayed as the main instrument for personal data 
protection in this field, as the member states had ratified it and it had references to third 
pillar measures. For instance, it was granted a key role in the context of the establishment 
of Eurojust269 and the Prüm Decision270. 
The Declaration No 21 annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference 
which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon271 recognized that the specific rules to protect personal 
data and it´s free movement in police cooperation may be necessary because of the specific 
nature of those fields.272 The TFEU Article 16(2) enables the Parliament and the Council 
to legislate on data protection across the EU law applying to all EU policies.273 This allows 
them to replace the DPD. The TFEU Article 16 refers to the free movement of personal 
data and the link to the right to the protection of personal data. The free movement of 
personal data effects indirectly the interpretation of Charter Article 8.274 In accordance 
with TFEU Article 16, the Council shall adopt a decision setting the rules to protect the 
individuals when their data is processed by the member states, when the states are 
performing duties within the scope of common foreign and security policies, and the rules 
on that data´s free movement.275 This sentence refers to the Council Framework Decision 
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2008/977/JHA276, which applied only to data processing which had a cross-border 
dimension between the EU member states. 
The DPD obliges the EU Commission to report to the Council and the Parliament on the 
Data Protection Directive´s implementation and propose for amendments, if necessary.277 
The Commission´s Communication of 2003, which reviewed the status of implementation 
of the DPD for the first time, stated that no legislative changes were necessary. The 
situation needed improvement and the Commission´s report contained a Work Programme 
for better implementation of the DPD.278 In 2007 the Commission issued a new 
Communication and still it did not consider it necessary to amend the DPD.279 This was 
before the signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007, after which the Commission´s opinion 
changed. In 2009 the Commission published a new consultation with a section on the 
protection of personal data and privacy, where it argued that the EU had to respond to the 
challenge posed by the increasing exchange of personal data and the need to protect 
privacy. The Commission referred to the Charter´s rights to privacy and the protection of 
personal data, and suggested that legislative initiatives may be necessary.280  
The Council requested in 2009 that the Commission evaluates the functioning of EU 
instruments on data protection and if necessary to present legislative and non-legislative 
initiatives. The Council continued that the impact these will have on the rights to privacy 
and the protection of personal data should be recognized.281 The Parliament welcomed a 
broad data protection system and invited the revision of the Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA. It asked the Commission and the member states to make sure that future 
EU action respects the fundamental rights and "strikes the right balance between security 
and freedom, and that this objective is adequately monitored and streamlined".282 The 
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Commission implemented the Council´s request into its Action Plan which stressed the 
importance of privacy in a global society where the data flows over borders. The EU´s 
approach must be strengthened in protecting the personal data in the context of all EU 
policies, including law enforcement. It is the Union´s task to ensure that the right to data 
protection is consistently applied.283 In 2010 the Commission published its aim to propose 
a revision of the legal framework for data protection in 2011.284 
3.1.2 Preliminary work at the EU institutions to protect the privacy 
This chapter will explain how the protection of the right to privacy was written into the 
Data Protection Directive on Police Matters. The Commission published a legislative 
package in 2012, which consisted of a proposal for a Regulation on the protection of 
individuals regarding the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data285 - the GDPR to replace the DPD. There was also a proposal for a Directive on the 
protection of individuals regarding the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such 
data286 - the Data Protection Directive on Police Matters to replace the Council Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
The Commission accompanied these proposals with a Communication to safeguard privacy 
and advance the protection of personal data with ensuring that individuals have the right to 
enjoy control over their personal data.287 The Communication contained the same 
innovations as its proposals, for an example the introduction of a right to be forgotten; the 
use of technologies to protect the privacy of information, default settings which are 
privacy-friendly and certification schemes for privacy; an obligation to notify of data 
breaches and to appoint data protection officers; the introduction of the privacy by design 
principle and the obligation to carry out data protection impact assessments; and the 
transformation of the Article 29 Working Party into the European Data Protection 
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Board.288 Even though the term 'privacy' is mentioned in the Communication´s title and in 
the text, it does not appear in the proposals themselves. 
The proposals for the GDPR and the Directive are based on the TFEU Article 16(2)289, and 
then centered on the right to the protection of personal data. They both state that their 
objective is to protect the natural persons´ fundamental rights and freedoms and 
particularly their right to the protection of personal data.290 The proposed legislation 
displaced privacy by personal data protection and it does not refer to Convention 108 
which does have “privacy” in its text. The GDPR seems to hesitate between competing 
conceptions of what constitutes a limitation on the fundamental right to personal data 
protection. It resembles the wording of the ECHR Article 8(2) and of the Charter Article 
52(1) when ruling on restrictions to the rules of the proposed GDPR, and when justifying 
the processing of personal data.291 The idea of data protection law serving especially the 
right to privacy has been replaced with the claim that it develops the right to the protection 
of personal data. This right is not mentioned as connected with the right to privacy or as an 
element of it, but in place of it. It seems like the processing of personal data alone 
amounted to a limitation of the fundamental right to the protection of personal data.292 
The proposed GDPR refers to “privacy” in the Recital dealing with sensitive data.293 The 
GDPR states that the communication of data breaches to the data subjects is likely to 
harmfully affect the protection of the personal data or privacy of the data subject294. These 
are defined in the GDPR´s preamble as breaches that could result in identity theft or fraud, 
physical harm, significant humiliation, or damage to reputation295. 
The EPDS commented on the data protection reform and the proposal of the Data 
Protection Directive on Police Matters. It stated that data protection is closely related to the 
                                                 
288 EU Commission, Communication: Safeguarding privacy in a connected world: A European Data 
Protection framework for the 21st Century. COM (2012) 9 final, 25.1.2012, p. 6-7, 9 & 11. 
289 TFEU, Article 16(2): see footnote 58. 
290 EU Commission Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, COM(2012) 11 final, 25.1.2012, p. 
40, Article 1, and EU Commission Proposal for a Data Protection Directive on Police matters, COM 10 final, 
25.1.2012, p. 27. Article 1. 
291 EU Regulation 2016/679, General Data Protection Regulation, Article 6 about lawfulness of processing 
and Article 22 about automated individual decision-making, including profiling. 
292 Fuster, 2014, p. 243-244. 
293 EU Commission Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, COM(2012) 11 final, 25.1.2012, 
Recital 41. 
294 EU Commission Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation, COM(2012) 11 final, 25.1.2012, 
Article 32(1). 
295 Ibid, Recital 67. 
54 
 
fundamental value of the right to privacy. The Directive respects the legal obligations as 
stated in international and EU law, as well as recognizes that privacy and data protection 
are fundamental values for society and its´ individuals. The EDPS stated that specific rules 
are needed due to the specific nature of the police and justice sectors. Data protection in 
these sectors should be coherent with the general rules written in the proposed GDPR296 
and be specified only if necessary. According to the EDPS, the Council changed the 
Directive´s nature to provide minimum harmonization and the member states may offer 
higher safeguards for data protection. Different levels of protection standards in the Union 
will make the exchange of information more difficult and hinder the cooperation between 
the competent authorities.297 
The EDPS refers to TFEU Article 16 which states that the Union must take care of the high 
standards of data protection and it cannot leave it to the member states alone.298 The EDPS 
sees that the new Directive does not harmonize the field as much as the GDPR would if it 
also contained the field covered by the Directive, and that the Directive leaves too much 
room for interpretation to the member states of its rules.299 The EDPS recommended the 
following sentence to the Directive´s Recitals: “The processing of personal data should be 
designed to serve man... it should respect [natural person´s]… rights to privacy and the 
protection of personal data and contribute to the well-being of individuals… [and] to the 
accomplishment of an area of freedom, security and justice”300, but it did not get through.  
The right to respect for private and family life is mentioned in the proposed Directive as 
one of the Charter´s rights that it respects “notably”.301 The word “privacy” is not in the 
final text, but the Directive claims to be respecting the Charter´s fundamental rights: the 
right to respect for private and family life and the right to the protection of personal 
data302. Through the reform the Commission aimed to improve the internal market 
dimension of data protection, improve the individuals´ exercise of data protection rights 
and to cover all areas of Union competence. It aims to ensure that individuals are in control 
of their personal data and that they feel they are being protected when their data is 
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processed.303 This aim is a good goal but it is not sure yet, if the safeguards in the new 
Directive can reach it in practice. The GDPR and the Directive will step into use in 2018. 
For the Union to be able adopt the Data Protection Directive on Police Matters it should be 
in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. The Union may adopt 
measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in the TEU Article 5304. 
The EU institutions acts must be appropriate for attaining the pursued legitimate objectives 
and do not exceed the limits of what is necessary and appropriate to achieve those 
objectives.305 The principle establishes two tests: the test of suitability and the test of 
necessity. The first measures whether the mean being used is suitable to reach the pursued 
ends. The second measures the competing interests: the consequences of restrictions, the 
right to legal protection, and if the consequences can be justified.306 The new Directive 
does not go beyond the principle of proportionality. The Directive´s objectives (the 
protection of the natural persons´ fundamental rights and freedoms and their right to the 
protection of personal data and to ensure the free exchange of that data by competent 
authorities within the EU) can be more sufficiently achieved at the Union level.307  
3.2 The Data Protection Directive on police matters 
This chapter will introduce the Data Protection Directive on Police Matters. The Directive 
is quite long as it contains 107 Recitals and 65 Articles, so it does not serve this thesis to 
go through them all one by one. Instead the introduction will be based on the rules it 
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directs to the member states to implement, which serve the protection of privacy when 
national public authorities process personal data. 
The Data Protection Directive on Police Matters is for "the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of 
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data” including the prevention of 
threats to public security.308 It repealed the Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA.309 This Directive applies to the national competent authorities’ processing 
of personal data by automated means for the above-mentioned purposes and to the 
processing of such data.310 It seeks to uniform the protection of personal data and to 
facilitate the exchange of data between member states competent authorities. The point is 
to enable effective judicial cooperation in criminal matters, although it steps into the 
member states´ sovereignty.311  
The Directive is divided into chapters based on their issues: general provisions; principles; 
rights of the data subject; controller and processor; transfers of personal data to third 
countries or international organizations; independent supervisory authorities; cooperation; 
remedies, liability and penalties; implementing acts; and, final provisions. The member 
states must adopt national legislation to comply with the Directive by 6.5.2018.312  
3.2.1 The objectives of the new Directive 
This chapter will introduce the objectives of the new Directive. The protection of personal 
data should be guaranteed equally everywhere in the EU. The Data Protection Directive on 
Police Matters serves to protect personal data in the work of the public authorities. It aims 
to ensure that the natural person´s level of protection of rights and freedoms is equivalent 
throughout the EU, in relation to the processing of their personal data by national public 
authorities.313 Through the Directive, the EU institutions enable the personal data to flow 
freely between the national authorities, to prevent, investigate and prosecute crimes or 
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execute criminal penalties. The aim is also to prevent threats to public security and to 
transfer the personal data to third countries and international organizations. The high level 
of protection of personal data should be maintained in all this. The protection should not 
depend on the used techniques or of the authorities´ instruments. The Directive applies to 
natural persons, whatever their nationality or place of residence.314  
The EU has adopted instruments in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
before adopting this new Directive. These specific provisions of acts should stay 
unaffected.315 These are for example, the provisions in the Prüm Decision316, or the 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the 
EU317. The Directive states in its Recitals that the Commission should evaluate the 
relationship between this Directive and those acts adopted before it. The Commission 
should evaluate the need for adjusting and if necessary to make proposals to create 
coherent legal rules of those provisions with this Directive.318 This is to ensure that the 
protection of personal data is guaranteed equally everywhere in the EU 
The GDPR319 spells general rules to ensure the free movement of personal data and to 
protect natural persons in relation to the processing of personal data within the EU. The 
new Directive and the GDPR supplement each other as they operate in different sectors but 
cooperate in the areas where they overlap. As an example, the GDPR applies when a 
competent authority lawfully discloses personal data to a recipient who is not a competent 
authority defined by the Directive. When the competent authority has collected personal 
data for one of the Directive purposes, the GDPR applies when that data is processed for 
other purposes than the ones named in this Directive.320 
3.2.2 The principles of the new Directive 
The Data Protection Directive on Police Matters repeats the principles of the data 
protection law established already in the DPD321. The difference is, as already mentioned, 
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that for the first time the Union directs these principles to apply also in the field of police 
matters. This chapter will go through the most relevant of these.  
The processing of personal data must be lawful, fair and transparent and used for specific 
purposes mentioned in law. The purpose for the processing should be explicit and 
legitimate, and determined when that data is collected. Individuals should be informed of 
the possible risks, rules, safeguards, and rights in relation to the processing of their 
personal data and how to use their rights.322 The member states shall make sure that 
personal data is:323  
• processed lawfully and fairly;  
• collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not processed in a manner 
that is incompatible with those purposes;  
• adequate, relevant and not excessive compared to the purposes why they are processed; 
• accurate and kept up to date;  
• kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is 
necessary for the purposes for which they are processed; and 
• processed so that the data´s security is ensured, including protection against 
unauthorized or unlawful processing and against accidental loss or damage.  
The data controller must prove he complies with the above set rules.324 The stored personal 
data must be reviewed and erased periodically after appropriate time limits.325 The concept 
of purpose limitation is an important principle. It has two main aspects: data should only be 
used for limited purposes and it should only be retained for a limited amount of time.326 
The right of presumption of innocence, as ordered by the Charter should not be threatened 
in the data processing especially when establishing different categories of data registries 
for natural persons. Different data subjects should be distinct from each other, such as 
persons suspected of committing a crime, persons convicted of a crime, and victims, and 
other parties such as witnesses.327 Facts based personal data must be separated from data 
which is based on personal assessments. The competent authorities should not make 
available nor transmit inaccurate and incomplete personal data and they should verify the 
quality of the data before processing. When personal data is sent to other authority, the 
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receiver should be able to evaluate its accuracy, completeness, and reliability. If incorrect 
personal data is transmitted or transmitted unlawfully, the recipient must be notified and 
the data should be corrected or erased or the processing restricted.328 
The data subject´s consent does not provide a legal basis for processing personal data by 
competent authorities. A national competent authority may process personal data if that is 
necessary for performing its tasks according to the objectives set in the Directive´s Article 
1(1). These must also be based on member state law, which specifies the objectives of the 
processing, it´s purposes and the processed personal data.329 The competent authorities 
may process personal data for other purposes than the ones´ set in the Article 1(1), if it 
fulfils the conditions of the Article 9330. Sensitive personal data can be processed if it is 
strictly necessary, with safeguards and where authorized by law to protect the natural 
person´s interests, or if the data subject has made the data public herself.331 A decision 
which is based on automated processing and produces harmful effects to the data subject, 
should be authorized by the law of the data subject and provide appropriate safeguards for 
her.332 
3.2.3 The rights of the data subject and obligations of the data controller 
This chapter introduces the rights of the data subject and the obligations of the data 
controller. Data processing may risk individual´s rights and freedoms and it may result to 
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physical, material or non-material damage to the concerned person.333 The new Directive 
has one chapter for the data subject´s rights. These rights contain rules of information that 
must be made available to the data subject, her right of access to her personal data and the 
provisions on limiting the right of access, the right to rectify or erase her data or to restrict 
the processing, and her rights in criminal proceedings. Also, the competent supervisory 
authority may exercise and verify the data subject´s rights.334  
The limitations to the data subject´s rights of access set in the Directive Article 15 are 
going to be dealt in detail in the chapter 4.3. This is because the Article allows the member 
states to adopt measures which restrict the data subject´s right of access to her data, with 
one basis being to protect national security. 
The member states shall establish the data controller’s liability for processing personal 
data. The controller’s activities have to comply with the new Directive and the controller 
must implement measures, which take into account the data protection principles by design 
and data protection by default, and evaluate the processing’s purposes, context, scope and 
nature and the risk to the data subject´s rights.335 The member states shall adopt laws 
which govern the processing by a processor and include a contract which binds the 
processor to the controller and require that the processor acts under the controller’s 
instructions. The processing must be able to be monitored and the controller or processor 
must record its processing activities (a log containing at least the identification of the 
person who consulted or disclosed personal data and the justification for the processing336) 
and cooperate with the supervising authority.337 The controller or processor has to evaluate 
the processing’s risks and implement measures to reduce them, such as encryption, to 
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maintain security and to prevent processing that is against this Directive. In case personal 
data is infringed, the controller notifies the supervisory authority unless the breach does not 
risk the person´s rights. In case of a risk, the data subject should be notified of it and 
guided on how to minimize further damages.338 EU law has no specific rule to ensure that 
the uses of encryption and anonymization techniques are protected.339 
The national supervisory authority monitors the application of this Directive to protect 
natural persons regarding the processing of their personal data. The concept of supervisory 
authority was already introduced in the chapter 1.1 in relation to Convention 108 and the 
CoE Police Recommendation. The Data Protection Directive on Police Matters demands 
the member states to establish an independent supervisory authority. The supervisory 
authority (or several, each with a separate task, adequate resources, and public annual 
budget) monitors the application of the rules adopted based on this Directive. Member 
states have already established the supervisory authority under the GDPR and the tasks 
under the new Directive may be transferred to this authority.340 The supervisory authority 
handles the data subjects’ complaints and investigates the matter, or transmits it to the 
competent authority, and then it informs the data subject of the progress and the outcome. 
The authorities’ tasks and powers to perform should be equal in each member state. They 
should be able to bring the Directive´s violations to the attention of the judicial authorities 
or to engage in legal proceedings. The supervisory authorities in different member states 
cooperate with each other and with the Commission.341 
Member states must implement and impose penalties, which are effective, proportionate 
and deterrent, on persons who breach the Directive. If data subject considers that her rights 
under this Directive are breached or if the supervisory authority does not act on her 
complaint, she has the right to have an effective judicial remedy in accordance with the 
Charter Article 47342. She has the right to a remedy at the national court where the 
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supervisory authority is established, against that authority´s decision producing legal 
effects concerning her.343  
3.2.4 Data protection and exchange of information in relation to third countries 
The EU member state´s public authorities may transfer information to other states´ public 
authorities in relation to their work. So far this has been regulated by Convention 108, 
guided by the CoE Police Data Recommendation344 and the Council Framework Decision 
2008/977/JHA. The Data Protection Directive on Police Matters states that a member 
state´s competent authority can send personal data to a third country´s competent authority, 
if the transfer fulfils the conditions of the Directive. These conditions being that the 
transfer is necessary, the receiving authority is authorized by this Directive and the third 
country ensures an adequate level of protection.345 The member states must make sure 
when public authorities transfer personal data to a third country, that it takes place only if it 
is necessary to prevent, investigate or prosecute crimes or to execute convictions. This 
includes the prevention of threats to public security and that the recipient´s data controller 
fulfils the Directive´s definition of a competent authority. Only the competent authorities 
acting as controllers should carry out the transfers.346 
When personal data is sent over the national borders, it may endanger the data subject´s 
possibility to exercise her data protection rights, and the supervisory authorities may 
become unable to operate outside their borders. The cooperation between the supervisory 
authorities needs development to help them exchange information with their foreign 
counterparts. The Data Protection Directive on Police Matters also recognizes this347. 
In relation to data exchange from the EU to third countries, the EU Commission´s main 
role is to ensure that the data protection principles are recognized. The Commission 
decides for the whole EU that third countries and international organizations provide an 
adequate level of protection. This is to reach EU wide uniformity and legal certainty. The 
definition for the adequacy of the protection was derived from the CJEU´s interpretation in 
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the Schrems case348 and from there written to the recitals of this Directive.349 The level of 
protection in a third country is adequate when it is essentially equivalent to that in the EU. 
The “essentially equal” standard is hard to meet in the field of national security law. Its 
assessment should be reflecting reality, not just the ideal world of law as written in the 
books. The doings of European authorities are not always transparent either. In 2016, the 
German secret service was excessively collecting data and spying on EU partners and 
NATO.350 
The Commission observes how the third country respects the rule of law, access to justice 
and the international human rights standards, as well as recognizes the third country´s 
participation in multilateral systems and the implementation of their obligations, as an 
example the accession to Convention 108. It looks at the legislation concerning national 
security, public order and criminal law. The Commission consults with the EDPB351 when 
evaluating the protection in third countries or international organizations. It should also 
consider its previous decisions adopted in accordance with the GDPR Article 45.352 The 
Commission prohibits the data transfers to that recipient which no longer provides an 
adequate level of protection. The transfers are again allowed if adequate safeguards are 
provided in a legally binding instrument (such as bilateral agreement).353 The Directive´s 
implementing powers are given to the Commission. This is to uniform the conditions for 
the implementation regarding the adequate level of protection provided by a third country 
and the cooperation between the supervisory authorities and the EDPB. If a third country 
no longer provides adequate protection, the Commission can adopt immediately applicable 
acts.354 
3.3 Conclusion of the section 3 
 This section introduced the EU´s data protection reform and the coming changes of the 
legislation on data protection in police matters. The reform is necessary as the EU is 
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responding to the challenge posed by the increasing exchange of personal data and the 
need to ensure the rights to data protection and the privacy in all EU competences. It is the 
Union´s task to ensure that the right to data protection is consistently applied. Thus the 
GDPR and the Data Protection Directive on Police Matters have been adopted by the EU 
and they both will come into force in 2018.  
This section also explained how the national authorities’ rights to process personal data are 
changing and what steps were taken in the process. The introduction of the Data Protection 
Directive on Police Matters covered the instrument´s main objectives and principles for 
data processing; the rights of the data subject and the obligations of the data controller and 
the national supervisory authorities; and the protection of personal data when it is 
transmitted to third countries.  
The Directive is abstract and needs clarification. It uniforms the member states data 
protection legislation in the field of police matters by setting the minimum level of 
harmonization. The Directive uses the phrase "shall provide", when it directs the member 
states to implement rules. This is partly a result of compromises between the member 
states respective interests. This issue of abstractness will be discussed in the section 4.  
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4 THE DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE ON POLICE MATTERS PROTECTS PRIVACY 
This section introduces the current national legislation dealing with data protection in the 
national public authorities work by using the Finnish legislation as an example of a 
member state´s law. The member states may face problems when implementing the Data 
Protection Directive on Police Matters, but as the implementation process has only begun it 
is difficult to say what is going to change in the national legislations. Finally, this section 
lays out possible advantages and problems of the uniform data protection legislation on 
police matters in the EU. Uniformity ensures equal protection and improves cooperation 
between the authorities, but the abstract new Directive allows the member states to adopt 
national legislations which differ significantly from each other. 
4.1 It is important to protect the privacy in the data protection legislation 
When a fundamental right collides with a collective good, it requires balancing and 
proportionality to define the right legal outcome. Balancing is necessary when laws are 
applied by an authority because fundamental rights provisions are vague.355 At his New 
Year´s speech in 2017, Finland´s President Mr. Sauli Niinistö addressed the balancing of 
the individuals´ fundamental rights and the authorities´ rights to gather data. He stated that 
the Finnish Constitution protects individual´s rights but we are facing questions, such as 
how should we react when we are balancing the collective security and the individual´s 
rights. When something bad happens, someone will ask why we did not do enough to stop 
the terrorism. And a bad answer is that we did not have sufficient powers. “A key role is 
played by effective data gathering and exchange of information and flexible co-operation 
between the authorities of different countries. Action is needed from the EU”.356  
Before 2000, the right to respect for private life was often seen as including the protection 
of personal data as its´ informational dimension.357 This approach was then replaced by the 
idea that these were two separate notions: the protection of the respect for private life and 
the protection of personal data. They are closely related and overlap in some cases. The 
protection of personal data was part of a wider respect for privacy, but at the same time it 
was also different from it. The right to protection of personal data can be explained as 
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resulting from a widening of the right to privacy, but being autonomous.358 The protection 
of personal data is especially important for the right to privacy.359 It may be difficult to 
separate these two rights, the right to data protection and the right to privacy. Some find 
these two to be one; some find that the protection of personal data adds to the protection of 
privacy; and some consider these to be two separate rights but connected to each other. As 
an example, in the data protection reform process, the German Government claimed to find 
it difficult to draw the line between the right to privacy and the right to data protection 
because in Germany the right to data protection is derived from the right to privacy. For 
another example, the Swedish Government found it difficult to understand clearly the 
concept of individual´s right to control her own data.360 
The CJEU stated in December 2016 that the right to the protection of personal data of the 
Charter Article 8 concerns a fundamental right which is distinct from that enshrined in the 
Charter Article 7 (the right to respect of private life) and which has no equivalent in the 
ECHR. The Court refused to state whether the protection guaranteed by the Charter 
Articles 7 and 8 is wider than that guaranteed in the ECHR Article 8.361 
The EDPS stated in its opinion of the proposed Directive, that data protection is closely 
related to the fundamental value of the right to privacy, and the CJEU confirms the 
importance of a protection in connection with law enforcement and national security. The 
CJEU warned in the case Digital Rights Ireland that data retention by authorities is “likely 
to generate in the minds of the persons concerned the feeling that their private lives are the 
subject of constant surveillance”362, and in the Schrems case the CJEU considered that 
public authorities access to the content of electronic communications affects the essence of 
the right to privacy if it is enabled on a generalized basis.363 The problem is how much 
freedom for data processing can the legislator give to the public authority for the 
investigative work without compromising the essence of the data subjects´ privacy. In 
1984 Judge Pettiti explained in his concurring opinion to the judgement of the ECtHR case 
Malone v. UK, that the CoE´s mission is to prevent the systems that would allow "Big 
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Brother" to become master of the citizen’s private life. It is just as serious to be made 
subject to measures of interference against one’s will as to be unable to stop such measures 
when they are illegal or unjustified.364 Mrs. Viviane Reding, the Vice-President of the 
Commission, stated in the EU Parliament in a debate concerning the forthcoming 
Directive, that the freedom and security of citizens are two sides of the same coin. They are 
two policy objectives that should be pursued in parallel. One cannot advance without the 
other, and one should not eliminate the other.365 The Directive respects the fundamental 
rights recognized in the Charter.366  
The CJEU cases Digital Rights Ireland367 and the Schrems368 increased commenting on the 
issue in the media. One comment after the Digital Rights Ireland decision sums up the 
result after these decisions: "More of these types of initiatives are needed in order to assure 
effective privacy and data protection"369. Most member state’s constitutional courts follow 
the reading of the Digital Rights Ireland judgment and are in line with the CJEU’s 
reasoning.370 Because of the CJEU´s rulings, several states´ courts invalidated their data 
retention legislation (i.e. Netherlands and Belgium), and some states amended their 
legislation (i.e. UK and Luxembourg).371 But many Governments interpret that the 
fundamental rights do not have the same weight, and that interception of communication 
data is a powerful tool to protect state security. The Finnish Constitutional Law Committee 
stated that there is no obstacle to the retention of data, if the proportionality requirements 
are met in other ways. The Finnish government is preparing surveillance legislation that 
would allow authorities' search-term based access to internet data.372 These CJEU rulings 
should impact the upcoming law and make it difficult to adopt if it is like those national 
laws which are now being amended around EU. The current Constitution does not allow 
the limitation of the right to privacy on basis of precautionary security. The constitution 
needs amending.373 
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4.2 Member states´ national legislation in the field currently  
The law which is still covering data protection in the work of the national investigative 
authorities will be in force until May of 2018 when the Data Protection Directive on Police 
Matters enters force. Before the upcoming Directive the EU member states had the 
possibility to independently interpret the principles of protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police cooperation in criminal matters as set in Convention 
108. When the national authorities transmit personal data to other states' authorities, it is 
covered by the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA374 if that member state has 
implemented the Decision into its national law.   
This paper shall use the Finnish national law as an example of the member state's national 
legislation covering the field. It is not necessary to go through the law with the same 
accuracy as the data protection law in EU, as the Inspector general, at the Office of the 
Finnish Data Protection Ombudsman, Mr. Heikki Huhtiniemi says that the Finnish law 
covering the police work has already implemented the data protection principles of the 
Data Protection Directive and the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA.375 EU law 
did not require this, but the Finnish legislator was willing to. 
4.2.1 What the Finnish authorities may do with the possessed personal data 
These principles guide all data processing in Finnish police work: the processing of 
personal data is based on law and in the course of lawful duty of the police, personal data 
is processed transparently, and the quality of the data and the rights of the registered person 
are guaranteed.376 If a Finnish police officer wants to check someone’s personal data from 
the authority’s data systems, the right to do so has to be granted by a specific national law. 
In Finland, the Data Protection Code377 and the National Police Act378 states that the 
officer has to have a special work related purpose for exercising her authority, or that the 
utilization of the data is necessary to ensure state security, to prevent a threat to life, or to 
                                                 
374 EU Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, 27.11.2008. 
375 Huhtiniemi, 2016. 
376 Poliisihallitus, 2010. 
377 Finnish Personal Data Code, Henkilötietolaki 523/1999, specifically Chapter 1 Article 7: (limitation for 
specific purpose) and Section 8: (General precondition for processing).  
378 Finnish Police Code, Poliisilaki 872/2011, Chapter 1 Section 5: (principle for limited purpose).  
69 
 
prevent or investigate an offence subject to imprisonment.379 The Finnish Act on the 
Processing of Personal Data by the Police (Laki henkilötietojen käsittelystä poliisitoimessa 
761/2003) applies to the processing of personal data needed for the performance of police 
duties. Firstly, this Act lists different police information systems used in Finland. Then it 
sets special provisions on processing personal data, and utilizing and supplying that data 
e.g. for purposes of their collection and the other purposes. After these it has provisions for 
deleting and archiving data, then provisions on processing personal data in connection with 
international police cooperation. After these come the rights of data subjects.380  
A landmark judgement on data protection issued in Finland by the Finnish district Courts 
came in 2014, when 72 police officers were convicted for data protection offences381 and 
for violating their official duty382. They had been scanning sensitive personal information 
of a famous cross-country skier Mr. Mika Myllylä. The convicted officers had been 
curious about the Olympic medalist´s cause of death in 2011 and they had no special work 
related purpose for checking his files.383 
The Finnish Code for police registries´ sets the rules for the police when it is exchanging 
data with foreign countries.384 The police have the right to give personal data from the 
police files to the International Criminal Police Organization or to its member states´ 
officials whose task is to maintain order in the society or crime prevention, investigation 
and prosecution.385 It may also supply data to foreign police authorities, or to other 
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authorities in such states whose duties include securing judicial and social order, 
maintaining public order and security, or preventing or investigating offences and 
forwarding them to a prosecutor. The data may be supplied if it is essential to ensure state 
security, prevent a danger threatening life or health or to prevent significant damage to 
property, or prevent or investigate an offence subject to imprisonment.386 
Investigative authorities have to be able to process personal data beyond the context when 
collected for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of specific criminal 
offences in order to understand criminal activities and to link different crimes. But the 
processing has to be connected to detective work, it must be for a particular and a legal 
purpose and it must be proportionate. As the professionals say – detectives should know 
what´s going on in their district. This need is also recognized in the new Directive.387  
4.2.2 Data protection rules applied in practice 
This chapter introduces how the data protection principles are implemented and applied in 
practice in the work of the national public authorities. When asked about the level of data 
protection in other EU member states, Mr. Huhtiniemi considered himself being unable to 
answer. It would require research on how protection is ensured in practice, although this 
would not only be done by looking at the provisions of the law.388 There are differences 
between the 28 member states. One concrete example of the differences between the 
legislation of the member states can be found in the ECtHR case S. And Marper v. UK, 
which showed the different approaches of the CoE member states on compulsory taking of 
DNA information in the context of criminal proceedings. In some countries, it was limited 
to only specific circumstances, however in the UK, it was systematic and indefinite 
retention, irrespective of the suspected offence or the age of the offender.389 
In 2013 the CoE published a report390 on how the CoE member states have implemented 
the CoE Police Data Recommendation391 rules in their national legislations (25 years after 
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adopting the Recommendation). This research was done by sending questionnaires to the 
national authorities of the member states. The respondents were often unable to provide 
information on how the data protection law is applied in practice. The results showed clear 
differences in the provided level of protection in the member states. The fact that the CoE 
states claim to have implemented the rules of Convention 108 does not mean that those 
standards are achieved or that they would be high enough.392 This supports the recognition 
of the Union institutions of the need to issue a reform package adopting two instruments - 
the GDPR and the Directive - to make the protection uniform in the EU. The EU does not 
have similar research of the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. 
In Finland, in addition to the national law, the National Police Board and the Ministry of 
the Interior have granted approximately over one hundred different manuals, handbooks 
and orders to instruct the police work. In practice these manuals guide the officer´s 
everyday work. Each action the authorities do has its own set of rules. For example, there 
is a binding order covering the registration of data to the police data system393, and an 
order for utilization of the police data in official duty394. Finnish police provide practical 
information to everyone on how her personal information is processed. This information is 
generally available at the official police web-site (www.poliisi.fi) and in every police 
station´s customer service desk (to mention two). The police´s customer can find 
information from the police documents of the issue in question and the officers are 
supposed to inform and guide the customer about her rights in the situation at hand.395 
The rules on how to handle classified information can be mentioned as an example of those 
specific manuals guiding the work. If taken literally, police officer is not allowed to leave 
any papers containing classified information (e.g. sensitive personal data) on her desk 
when leaving her office even if the room can be locked. Such documents must be in a 
locked shelf and the classified information with the highest rating may be stored only in 
vaults, etc. Officers are not allowed to send classified information via normal e-mail, but 
via secured e-mail. Every paper (documents and notes) containing classified information, 
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which becomes useless, must be fully destroyed via specific secured system as they are not 
allowed to be left in a form or in a place, where outsiders can get a hold of them.396 
These manuals are available to every officer in the police online system called Sinetti, but 
perhaps due to the vast amount of these handbooks and continuously changing regulations, 
they are not circulated among the officers when published or amended. In practice, it is 
impossible for every officer to know and apply these orders and manuals and it is crucial to 
know how personal data and privacy are protected in practice. 
Every Finnish police officer goes through a three and a half year long professional 
education, which also covers data protection matters, before the officer can begin using the 
police data systems.397 When in actual work, every officer must pass a compulsory online 
course and an examination covering the police personal data law to be allowed to process 
personal data in her work (in Finnish: Poliisin henkilötietolaki -verkkokurssi). This course 
goes through the most important provisions covering the processing of personal data in 
everyday police work. These include practical examples from the work which concerns the 
manuals and handbooks granted by the National Police Board. The course covers the 
relevant definitions, general principles of processing data, the purpose limitation of the 
processing, the data subject´s rights and access to her data, different data systems and their 
usage, security matters, DNA and fingerprint gathering, etc.398 The course consists of three 
pre-exams and a final exam. Then another online course handles the police data systems 
covering the aspects of use of those systems and their maintenance, controlling data 
security problems and the usage of the secured e-mail in the police work.399 
Currently most of the Finnish police officers investigate crimes by using papers and 
producing more papers (questioning forms, crime reports, etc.). When the criminal 
investigation is ready, the practice is that the police then store one copy of the report to a 
vault and send two paper copies to the public prosecutor and one copy to each party of the 
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investigation. In simple, a normal crime with one victim and one offender produces at least 
five piles of paper. One practical example of a safer way to handle personal data in a 
criminal investigation is to process everything electronically in the police data systems, 
instead of storing them as papers in folders. This way the documents are always behind at 
least one password. The practice of sending two paper copies of the report to the 
prosecutor is based only on internal procedure, not law. This automated processing of 
reports is not yet common in Finnish police work, but it is slowly spreading. The electronic 
identification and signature would remove the necessity of signing papers by hand. 
The online courses arranged for Finnish officers are handy to make sure that every officer 
receives and learns the latest rules regulating the field. When reflecting this Finnish 
practice to the results of the CoE report published in 2013, it is evident that the Union 
legislation requires harmonization. 
4.2.3 How the Finnish legislation is going to change due to the new Directive 
In the beginning of 2017 it is still too early to evaluate how the new Directive will affect 
the Finnish national law. The Finnish Ministry of Justice has established a working group 
to form a proposal to the Finnish Government of the implementation of the new Directive 
to Finnish legislation.400 The Senior Officer Mrs. Virpi Koivu, from the Police Department 
of the Ministry of the Interior, is currently participating in the organization formulating this 
proposal as the representative of the Police Department. According to Mrs. Koivu, at this 
point it is too early to say what is going to change in the current national legislation.401 
Mr. Huhtiniemi, who is also participating to this working group with Mrs. Koivu, takes the 
same stand. But on a theoretical level Mr. Huhtiniemi thinks that the Finnish law is not 
likely to change much, if one looks only at the general principles.402 The GDPR will 
replace the Finnish Personal Data Code (Henkilötietolaki 523/1999) at 25.5.2018 and 
presumably the Data Protection Directive on Police Matters will be implemented into the 
Finnish Act on the Processing of Personal Data by the Police (Laki henkilötietojen 
käsittelystä poliisitoimessa 761/2003). 
                                                 
400 Oikeusministeriö, 12.1.2017. 
401 Koivu, 2017. 
402 Huhtiniemi, 2016. 
74 
 
Whether the protection of personal data and privacy are already at an adequate level in 
Finland from the perspective of police matters, Mr. Huhtiniemi cannot answer, because he 
doesn´t know what the terms "adequate" or "enough good" mean in this relation. He 
mentions that there is always something to fix, as some authorities leak information to the 
media and others utilize information without a work-related purpose.403 
The Finnish law is already at the same level as required by the CJEU decisions Digital 
Rights Ireland404 and Tele2 Sverige AB405. The Finnish authorities do not have legal 
grounds to gather personal data unless for specific purpose. President Niinistö referred in 
his speech to the current changes in the Finnish national legislation, especially to the 
forthcoming Data Collection Act which is currently being formulated but not yet in force, 
but the President also calls for the EU to act.406 These CJEU's decisions will make it 
difficult for the Finnish legislator to write this new Act if it would allow general and 
indiscriminate collection of personal data. Mr. President´s request is confusing however, as 
on the one hand he is asking for more rights to gather personal data to protect national 
security and calling for the EU to act. At the same time the EU institutions are acting to 
ensure the high-level protection of Charter rights in the authorities' data processing and the 
CJEU is ordering the member states to remove their general data retention procedures. 
4.3 Pros and cons of the uniform data protection legislation and the Directive 
This chapter will introduce some points from the both sides of the uniform data protection 
legislation on police matters in the EU. Mr. Huhtiniemi states that time will tell as to how 
the implementation of the new Directive works out. He explains that the member states´ 
legislation on data protection in police matters differ from each other. The national 
authorities have different approaches to the aspects under the third pillar. As an example, 
some countries have stronger rules on secrecy and the data subjects do not have equally 
wide possibilities to access their personal data and some police sectors may be outside the 
supervision.407 
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4.3.1 Possible problems in future 
The EU member states still rely on mechanisms of cooperation based on norms that do not 
take into consideration the evolution of technologies. The police investigation will be 
complicated when it involves several jurisdictions as the legislation is not harmonized.408 
The Data Protection Directive on Police Matters states that it aims to uniform the level of 
protection of the natural persons´ rights in member states in relation to the processing of 
their personal data.409 The EDPS stated that data protection in the police sectors should be 
consistent with the general rules written in the proposed GDPR410 and be specified only if 
necessary. The Directive harmonizes at the minimum level. When member states can adopt 
legislation, which implements the Directive´s provisions differently than other states, it 
may create negative effects to the data subjects and unequal treatment between the member 
states.411 Different standards of data protection will complicate the exchange of 
information and hinder the cooperation between the authorities. It is difficult to identify the 
individuals involved in the crime, the competent jurisdiction and to obtain evidence. 
In the drafting process of the Data Protection Directive on Police Matters the EU Council 
included a sentence “or the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public 
security”412 to the draft Directive, as a ground to interfere with individuals´ rights. This 
“prevention of threats to public security” can be interpreted to mean basically anything the 
current national public authority considers threatening, whether it is a threat or not. 
Nevertheless, this sentence was included in the final text. Mr. Huhtiniemi sees the "public 
security" and "national security" as evolving concepts. The legislators are not able to 
predict the development of the world in future, so their meanings should not be too strictly 
written in the law or it might narrow the authorities´ freedom of interpretation.413  
The current trend in Europe is that the authorities want to gather more data.414 Mr. 
Huhtiniemi states that the authorities already have access to a vast amount of data but the 
problem is that there are not enough resources to analyze even that. And the open internet 
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is only the tip of the iceberg. Under that there are the TOR and other secret and anonymous 
ways for the criminals to communicate online. The right answer is not to collect, for 
example everyone´s DNA into police files, but rather the measure has to be proportionate 
as the DNA of innocent people does not belong in the police files. Mr. Huhtiniemi asks 
what this would achieve and answers that the police could catch few suspects. It is not 
about confrontation but finding the right balance. When the authorities ask for more tools 
for gathering personal data, first the already existing tools should be evaluated, as to 
whether those are effective.415  
But an innocent person should have nothing to hide. The problem with the “nothing to 
hide” argument is that it only considers the need to control personal facts. By compiling 
data from different sources, the authorities can form personal profiles about persons. These 
profiles may reveal sensitive facts and be used to predict future actions and to categorize 
someone as risk. Large-scale data collection presents risks because un-authorized persons 
can use that data. Different government data centers have been hacked and governments 
spy on each other. The problem is not the individual´s inability to hide facts from others 
but her inability to control how her data is used. The use of surveillance data is a problem 
of power imbalance.416 As Lindroos-Hovinheimo says, privacy is like a gift that someone 
can give to the other.417 
The fight against international terrorism to maintain international peace and security 
constitutes an objective of general interest, just as does the fight against serious crime to 
ensure public security. The fight against terrorism is important to ensure public security. Its 
effectiveness depends on the use of modern investigation techniques. But an objective of 
general interest does not justify a generalized data retention measure.418 The states cannot 
adopt whatever measures they find appropriate, even to fight against terrorism. There has 
to exist adequate and effective guarantees against abuses.419 At the time of 9/11 the threat 
of terrorism was serious. That is shown by both the wording of the UN resolutions of 
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suspected terrorist organizations and the way they were adopted. However, the maintaining 
or reinforcement of those measures must be explained and justified convincingly.420  
As Mr. Huhtiniemi points out, the new Directive allows wide possibilities to the member 
states to interpret the provisions. As an example, he points to the Directive´s Article 4421, 
and its adjectives "specified" and "explicit" purposes as well as "adequate", "relevant", "not 
excessive" and "accurate". These are not clear and should not be written directly into the 
national law before first made concrete. Mr. Huhtiniemi asks what those adjectives mean 
and what the correct way to interpret them is. It is the CJEU´s task to assess, but everyone 
should be able to understand the final national legislation.422  
Member states are able to adopt legislative measures to restrict the data subject´s access to 
her personal data, as long as such measures are justified, necessary and proportionate, and 
comply with the Charter and the ECHR, as interpreted in the case-law of the CJEU and the 
ECtHR.423 Most of the EU member states have already transposed the main principles of 
the new Directive into their national law, thanks to the impact of the CoE Police Data 
Recommendation424 and the Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA. So one can be 
skeptical as to whether the Directive is going to have real impact on legislation.425 The 
future will show how they have implemented the Directive´s rules in their legislations and 
how the interpretations differ from each other. 
4.3.2 Advantages of the uniform legislation 
EU wide uniform legislation enables effective cooperation between the public authorities. 
Already in 2005, The Hague Programme fixed priorities for the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, and described the principle of availability as the possibility for a member 
state´s public authority to obtain information from another member state.426 The 
Commission commented in 2012 that the cross-border cooperation in police matters needs 
improvement. The legislation in the EU should be implemented Union wide and the 
Europol channel should be used systematically in the member states to create an EU-wide 
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picture of cross-border criminality.427 When the products of the police investigation are in 
electronic form, that information can be shared among the authorities. This way it is 
possible to link different offences, offenders and incidents to each other. The advanced 
investigation is very much about finding patterns between incidents and crimes. 
An anonymous source working in the international police cooperation presented the 
Spanish authorities as an example of a poor cooperation culture. The police departments 
around Spain do not exchange information effectively even between each other and the 
Catalonian authorities hardly communicate at all with the rest of Spain. As there are 
difficulties in national cooperation, it is natural that cooperation with foreign authorities is 
not any better. The purpose is not to shame Spain, but to clarify the general difficulties. 
The way personal data is collected, stored, and labeled, may influence the data subject´s 
presumption of innocence in case it is done in a careless manner. The new Directive orders 
the member states to establish the supervisory authorities. They should be able to bring 
these Directive´s infringements to the attention of the judicial authorities.428 When these 
national authorities cooperate, it improves the security of individuals. 
The CJEU strengthens the importance of a high level of protection of fundamental rights 
when data is processed in relation to national security and police matters.429 Before the 
Data Protection Directive on Police Matters, this field was not uniformly regulated in the 
EU. The CoE member states, for example, do not have a common understanding of the 
term "technical surveillance or other automated means", and police practices vary between 
states as far as technical or other automated means of surveillance is concerned. Some CoE 
states have only some, or none, of their police systems available on-line.430  
The new Directive eases the accomplishment of an area of freedom, security, and 
justice.431 It harmonizes the member states legislations in the field. It sets the minimum 
level of regulation by stating in almost every Article, that the member states "shall 
provide" certain provisions in their domestic legislation. It aims to ensure that the natural 
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persons´ level of protection of rights is equal in all member states in relation to the 
processing of their personal data.432 The good side is that the member states must provide 
at least the same level of protection in their legislation. The new Directive and the GDPR 
supplement each other as they operate in different sectors but cooperate in the areas where 
they overlap. As an example, the Regulation applies when a competent authority lawfully 
discloses personal data to a recipient who is not a competent authority defined by the 
Directive.433 Mr. Heikki Partanen states that the division of data protection law into the 
GDPR in commercial matters, and the Directive on police matters is a good idea. In police 
matters the aim is to identify unknown subject by processing her data, while in commercial 
matters the aim is to use the data to make individuals act in a certain manner, for example 
to buy the advertised good.434 
The head of the EDPS Mr. Giovanni Buttarelli gave a supportive comment of the 
instrument in 2015. He stated that the rules in the Directive are consistent with the GDPR 
and the level of protection ensured by the Directive is at least at the same level as is 
currently ensured by other EU laws and instruments. Mr. Buttarelli explains that the EDPS 
wants the investigative authorities to be effective in the future and the smooth information 
sharing between the authorities is now more important than ever.435 A multidisciplinary 
discussion is a priority because of the technical knowledge required in this field, a better 
cooperation with engineers and informatics is needed to maintain a human-rights-based 
approach. Policy makers, public authorities, companies, academics, technicians, 
programmers and individuals must cooperate to make the communication reliable.436 
4.4 Conclusion of the section 4 
The question of this thesis is whether the forthcoming Data Protection Directive on Police 
Matters ensures protection of the individual´s right to privacy. The answer is not yet clear. 
Mr. Huhtiniemi states that the adequacy of the protection must be viewed from the 
perspective of the whole Directive. Data protection law has to contain all the elements 
mentioned earlier in the previous pages. It has to contain the safeguards and legal 
remedies, the data subject´s access to the personal data and so on. It extends to the lifespan 
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of the personal data and the whole chain of data processing has to be correct.437 When 
information flows freely across national borders, the only way to protect those people 
whose information is being transmitted is to uniform the legislation between the member 
states. Smooth cooperation between law-enforcement authorities is important.   
This section introduced the current national legislation dealing with data protection in the 
work of national public authorities by using the Finnish legislation as an example. The 
Finnish law already covers the data protection rules of the EU´s previous data protection 
instruments. The new Directive should not bring too many new changes in that sense, but 
the member states differ from each other with their legislation on this field. As the 
implementation process of the new Directive has only begun, it is too early to say what is 
going to change in the national legislations. As the Finnish system is at an adequate level 
already, it can be a good indication of where the other member states are heading towards. 
The new Directive will harmonize at the minimum level. The Finnish ministries have 
produced a pile of handbooks and manuals guiding the authorities´ work. It is likely that 
the other member states are about to face the same situation. Perhaps Finland can present 
the online course mentioned earlier as an effective tool to ensure that every national data 
processor and competent official knows the requirements of data protection. Secondly, the 
electronic investigation of crimes should rise in popularity among the authorities. 
The national authorities may interfere with people´s fundamental rights if it is based on 
national security and public interest requirements. The fight against serious crime and 
terrorism is important to ensure public security and its effectiveness may depend on the use 
of modern investigation techniques. But an objective of general interest in itself does not 
justify an indiscriminate and generalized data retention measure.438 It is for the national 
authorities and Courts to primarily interpret and apply the domestic law.439 EU wide 
uniform legislation improves the cooperation between the authorities but the abstract 
Directive allows the member states to adopt legislations which differ from each other. This 
is likely to create negative effects and unequal treatment between the data subjects. 
Different standards hinder the cooperation between the authorities. When member states 
are forced to uniform their legislations and the instrument guiding the process is abstract, it 
is impossible to predict the outcome.  
                                                 
437 Huhtiniemi, 2016. 
438 CJEU, Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, 8.4.2014, para 51. 
439 ECtHR, No. 11801/85, Kruslin v. France, 24.4.1990, paras 27 - 29. 
81 
 
THE CONCLUSION OF THE THESIS 
The EU´s data protection law is under reform. The Union has adopted the GDPR to repeal 
the DPD, which is currently governing data protection in EU. The DPD applies to the 
processing of personal data in member states in the public and the private sectors, but it 
does not apply to activities in the areas of judicial and police cooperation in criminal 
matters. To fix this lack of scope the EU adopted the Data Protection Directive on Police 
Matters. It aims to ensure that the level of protection of individuals´ rights is equal in all 
member states in relation to the processing of their personal data in police matters.440 
The question of this thesis is whether the new Directive ensures the protection of the right 
to privacy. The answer is three-folded. Firstly, it is too early to say as the new Directive is 
abstract and its implementation process is not ready. Secondly, it does, as the protection is 
already good in the Union´s legislative instruments and the new Directive only extends the 
data protection principles to cover the field of police matters. And thirdly, the 
implementation of the new Directive has problems because the member states´ national 
legislative systems and the cultures of application differ. Some countries, like Finland, 
have manuals and handbooks of data protection principles to be applied in practice and 
even compulsory courses which the officers must pass to be entitled to practice their 
profession. Some member states do not have such as was presented in the CoE report of 
the implementation of the CoE Police Data Recommendation. 
The compressed list of the data protection principles, safeguards and findings 
This thesis firstly introduced the current European legislation covering the investigative 
authorities work in relation to the protection of personal data and the protection of the right 
to privacy. It explained the operation of both relevant systems - the legislations of the CoE 
and the EU, and the main principles guiding the processing of personal data.  
Secondly, this thesis went through the recent trends found in the European Courts in 
relation to the protection of personal data and privacy. It introduced the principles and 
interpretations established by the ECtHR and the CJEU, when national public authorities 
interfere with individual´s privacy in relation to data processing. Both Courts have similar 
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approach to the requirement of safeguards on measures interfering with individual´s rights. 
The national public authorities may interfere with an individual´s fundamental rights when 
fighting against serious crimes, but states cannot adopt whatever measures they find 
appropriate, even to fight against terrorism. The interference is justified if it is based on a 
national law provision which is precise, accessible to the concerned persons and its effects 
are foreseeable. The level of precision that is required of the law depends of the subject 
matter.441 The legislation needs to govern the scope and application of measures interfering 
with individual´s privacy. The domestic legislation cannot provide for every eventuality, 
but it needs to have minimum safeguards against abuse concerning, inter alia, duration, 
storage, usage, third parties´ access, procedures for its destruction and for guarding the 
integrity and confidentiality of data. The data subject must be able to rely on that her data 
is accurate, processed in a lawful manner and disclosed only to authorized recipients. She 
must be able to fix possible faults in her data.  
The fight against terrorism to maintain international peace and security constitutes an 
objective of general interest, just as does the fight against serious crime to ensure public 
security.442 The Courts have been prudent with new technologies which enable wider 
possibilities for the authorities to interfere with individuals´ privacy. When personal data is 
processed by automated means the protection must be stronger. The fight against serious 
crime is important to ensure public security and its effectiveness may depend on the use of 
modern investigation techniques. The interference must refer to a pressing social need and 
be proportionate to the pursued legitimate aim. The national security interests may prevail 
over the individual ones, but an objective of general interest does not justify an 
indiscriminate and generalized data retention measure. Retained data must have at least 
some kind of a relationship to public security. The national legislation must be based on 
objective evidence of a certain public whose data is likely to reveal a link with serious 
crimes and to help in some way to fight these crimes or prevent a risk to public security.  
Through those cases this thesis clarified the CJEU´s connection to the interpretations of the 
ECtHR. The CJEU has based its reasoning of the right to data protection and the right to 
respect of private life on the interpretations of the ECtHR. In the beginning the CJEU did 
not refer to the Charter but focused only on the ECHR. After 2009 when the Charter 
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acquired the status of primary EU law, the CJEU began to move away from the ECHR and 
to use it as the main instrument to interpret the rights to data protection and privacy. 
Thirdly, this thesis introduced how the EU´s legislation on data protection is changing. 
Specifically, it focused on introducing the forthcoming Data Protection Directive on Police 
Matters. And then fourthly, the thesis collected information to protect the core claim of the 
thesis, that the forthcoming Directive does protect the right to privacy.  
The concept of the adequate protection of privacy 
Inspector general Huhtiniemi, from the Office of the Finnish Data Protection Ombudsman, 
says that the adequate protection of privacy does not yet have a definition. It is the CJEU´s 
task to assess. Mr. Huhtiniemi looks at the adequacy of the protection of privacy from the 
perspective of the whole instrument - in this case the new Directive. The protection is not 
established in one specific Article. The data protection law must contain all the elements 
and safeguards mentioned earlier. The protection of privacy in practice comes from all the 
aspects gone through in this thesis and it extends to the lifespan of the personal data. The 
evaluation is conducted on a case-by-case basis and the whole chain of data processing 
must be right. The level of protection of privacy must be evaluated in practice. 
The DPD supports this view in relation to transmitting personal data from EU to a third 
country. When personal data is sent from EU member states to a third country, that transfer 
may take place only if the receiving state ensures a level of protection of privacy that is 
adequate, i.e. essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU. The DPD Article 
25(2) states that the adequacy of the protection shall be assessed “in the light of all the 
circumstances surrounding a data transfer”. The national law must provide adequate 
protection against arbitrary interference of privacy. "This assessment depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of the possible measures, 
the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to permit, carry out and 
supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law".443  
The head of the EDPS Mr. Buttarelli has stated that the rules in the new Directive are 
consistent with the GDPR and the level of protection ensured by the Directive is at least at 
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the same level as is currently ensured by other EU laws and instruments. The assurance 
that the protection of privacy will be at least at the same level in the future indicates that 
the current level of protection is good. 
The implementation of the new Directive is still far and out of reach 
The member states may face problems when implementing the new Directive into their 
national legislations. As Mr. Huhtiniemi points out, the Directive allows wide possibilities 
to the member states to interpret the provisions. The terms in the instrument are not clear 
and should not be written directly into the national legislation but first made concrete. 
When member states can adopt legislation, which implements the Directive´s provisions 
differently than other states, it may create negative effects to the data subjects and unequal 
treatment between the states. Different levels of data protection standards will complicate 
the exchange of information and hinder the cooperation between the authorities. 
The new Directive does not harmonize the field as much as the GDPR would do if the 
GDPR also contained the field covered by the Directive. The protection of privacy would 
be unacceptably weakened if the use of modern techniques in the criminal-justice system 
were allowed without balancing the possible benefits of the extensive use of such 
techniques against privacy interests. A state which claims to be a pioneer in the 
development of new technology should find the right balance in this regard.444 The Finnish 
obligatory online course is good way to ensure that every officer dealing with personal data 
does know what she can do to it and with it. 
At this point it is too early to fully answer whether the new Directive ensures adequate 
protection to privacy as it is not yet in force. When member states are forced to uniform 
their legislation, which are characterized by their own legislative and cultural traditions, 
and the instrument guiding the process is abstract, it is impossible to predict the outcome. 
A good intention may result in bad consequences. The national organs interpret the 
provisions of the new Directive and then after the Directive is in force someone might raise 
a question to the CJEU and ask if it was implemented correctly in the national laws. The 
future will show how the member states implemented the Directive´s rules and how the 
interpretations differ from each other. Further research is needed to find the answers. 
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